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INTRODUCTION
After all, the dangers that face the world, every one of them, can be
traced back to science. The salvations that may preserve the world,
every one of them, will be traced back to science. I
If we can assume that "the reason that judges (and lawyers) are in the
courtroom is because they did not want to study science and they had no
interest in science and majored in something that had nothing to do with it,"2
those of us who study and practice law today have a serious problem. As
Justice Stephen Breyer has repeatedly warned, "[t]he legal disputes before us
increasingly involve the principles and tools of science."'3 Thus, it is important
that judges, lawyers, and legal scholars understand basic scientific principles
* Assistant Professor of Law, New England School of Law. I am indebted to my
colleagues, Allison M. Dussias, Russell Engler, Peter M. Manus, and Russ VerSteeg, for
their thoughtful comments to drafts of this Article. The research for the Article was made
possible through a James R. Lawton Research Grant created by the Trustees of the New
England School of Law and awarded by Dean John F. O'Brien. Finally, I am deeply
grateful to Marshall E. Tracht and David M. Siegel, whose astonishing insight and bold
critique shape all of my work as their unwavering loyalty and abiding friendships enrich my
life.
' Leslie Alan Horvitz, The Quotable Scientist 159 (McGraw-Hill 2000) (quoting Isaac
Asimov).
2 Judicial Panel Discussion on Science and the Law, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 1127, 1128
(1993) (quoting Professor Steven J. Grossman). Although this article is limited in scope to
the federal courts, it may also prove useful to those practicing in jurisdictions that have
adopted the Daubert/Kumho test for scientific admissibility. The issue of scientific
evidence in the state courts has been extensively addressed elsewhere. See e.g. Paul
Gianelli, Forensic Science: Daubert in the States, 34 Crim. L. Bull. 154 (1998).
3 Justice Stephen Breyer, Introduction, in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 2
(Federal Judicial Center 2000). The Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence was first
published by the Federal Judicial Center in 1994 as a response to the Supreme Court's
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Although it
provides a wide range of helpful and practical information on science and law, the
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence has been criticized as defense-oriented by various
plaintiffs' organizations. Joseph T. Walsh, Keeping the Gate: The Evolving Role of the
Judiciary in Admitting Scientific Evidence, 83 Judicature 140, 141 (1999) (noting also the
belief that the manual misinterprets Daubert's teaching).
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and methodologies. According to Justice Breyer, the potential effects of the
misuse of science "matter[] not just to the litigants, but also to the general
public-those who live in our technologically complex society and whom the
law must serve." 4
The disjuncture between science and law became a significant practical,
rather than theoretical, problem in 1993 when the Supreme Court decided
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.5 Daubert was a radical break
from a tradition of judicial deference to scientific norms and conventions on
questions of the admissibility of scientific evidence. The Court called upon the
federal judiciary to slam the gate on all scientific evidence that is not
"'scientific knowledge' . . . derived from the scientific method."' 6 Since 1993,
the Supreme Court has issued three opinions clarifying Daubert,7 and countless
judges and legal commentators have wrestled with the application of Daubert's
judicial "gatekeeping" requirement. 8 Although the Court intended Daubert
and its progeny to enhance the developing relationship between science and
law, this promise of Daubert has not yet been realized. Instead, Daubert has
imposed a foreign and unwieldy burden on judges who must resolve questions
of scientific admissibility,9 lawyers who must master the scientific theories of
expert witnesses, and legal and scientific scholars searching for meaning and
I Breyer, supra n. 3, at 2.
5 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See also infra Part I.A(1) (discussing the Daubert case).
6 Id. at 590.
7 Legal scholars normally refer to the "Daubert trilogy" as including Daubert, Gen.
Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S.
137 (1999). For reasons discussed below, however, a thorough analysis of Supreme Court
doctrine on science and law should also include United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303
(1998). See infra Part I.A(2).
8 In light of the general and sometimes confusing nature of Daubert, "[a]ttempting to
understand the application of Daubert by trial and appellate courts in the years that
immediately followed can be frustrating. Daubert is a very incomplete case, if not a very
bad decision.... What resulted was a series of conflicting and confusing opinions."
Michael H. Graham, The Expert Witness Predicament: Determining "Reliable" Under the
Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho, and Proposed Amended Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 54 U. Miami L. Rev. 317, 321 (2000).
9 Many judges have expressed discomfort with the process of reviewing scientific
methodologies and techniques and believe that Daubert and its progeny have made their
lives more difficult. See e.g. Scott C. Andre, Weird Science: Problems with the U.S.
Supreme Court's New Evidentiary Standard for Expert Testimony and Oregon Case Law as
a Possible Solution, 73 Or. L. Rev. 691, 692 (1994) (stating that Daubert places too heavy a
burden on judges to make qualitative determinations about science); Jennifer Laser,
Inconsistent Gatekeeping and Federal Courts: Application of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharm., Inc. to Nonscientific Expert Testimony, 30 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 1379, 1380 (1997)
(observing that the application Daubert rule has split the circuits); Rory Sherman, "Junk
Science" Rule Used Broadly: Judges Learn Daubert, Natl. L. J. 3, 28 (Oct. 4, 1993)
(describing judicial discomfort with the Daubert decision and quoting U.S. District Judge
Jack B. Weinstein as saying "[a]fter all, we're not scientists").
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direction.
In the midst of this maelstrom, one year after the Daubert decision, Justice
Stephen Breyer joined the Court and has taken the helm. His most substantive
contribution to date, the majority opinion in Kumho Tire Co.. v. Carmichael t°
offered future courts a subtly transformed analytic tool for assessing scientific,
technical and other specialized evidence. Justice Breyer's public statements
and writings further demonstrate his view that good science and good law are
increasingly interdependent. In a recent speech before members of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science, he described the
relationship between science and law as follows:
The fact of interdependence is evident. You find it obvious that the
practice of science depends upon sound law-law that, at a minimum,
provides support for science by offering the scientist breathing space,
within which he or she may search freely for the truth upon which all
knowledge depends. It may be less obvious to you, but it is equally true,
that the law itself increasingly needs access to sound science .... [A]s
society becomes more dependent for its well being upon scientifically
complex technology, we find that this technology increasingly underlies
legal issues of importance to all of us. "
If justice requires valid science, we must avoid and denounce efforts to
manipulate science within the legal system.
The legitimate incorporation of science into law begins by separating the
notion of scientific validity from the idea that a particular scientific theory
serves some other goal. It is therefore irrelevant to the validity of a scientific
theory that it helps our client, jibes with our social or political inclinations,
resonates with the public, benefits the legislature, or proves useful to the
courts.12 Although it may be true that "many people choose scientific beliefs
the same way they choose to be Methodists, or Democrats, or Chicago Cubs
10 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
I1 Associate Justice Stephen J. Breyer, Speech, "The Interdependence of Science and
Law" (Association for the Advancement of Science Annual Meeting and Science Innovation
Exposition, Feb 16, 1998) <http://aaas.org/meetings/1998/breyer98.htm>. For example, we
have seen a rapid increase in the use of medical expert testimony in the context of cases
involving DNA analysis. See e.g. Jonathan J. Koehler, Proving the Case: The Science of
DNA: On Conveying the Probative Value of DNA Evidence: Frequencies, Likelihood
Ratios, and Error Rates, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 859 (1996) (noting the advent of the
presentation of DNA evidence in the courtroom).
12 In a previous article I have explored the problems created by laws and doctrine
designed to satisfy community hatred of those charged with sex offenses. See generally
Jodlle Anne Moreno, "Whoever Fights Monsters Should See to It That in the Process He
Does Not Become a Monster": Hunting the Sexual Predator with Silver Bullets-Federal
Rules of Evidence 413-415-and a Stake Through the Heart-Kansas v. Hendricks, 49 Fla.
L. Rev. 505 (1997).
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fans ... by how well it agrees with the way they want the world to be,"'13 legal
scholars and practitioners must strive to make unbiased assessments of
scientific validity.14 As a distinguished group of professors and scholars
recently wrote in an amicus brief for the Supreme Court in Browner v.
American Trucking Associations,15  "[s]cience describes, it does not
prescribe."' 16 Although we may understand that science, in theory, should be
value-neutral, problems arise "[i]n an adversarial system, where even facts
come in two versions, [and] it's easy to view science as just another form of
spin."17
Any genuine effort to improve our ability to understand and use science
must also transcend the popular academic sport of denouncing "junk
science."' 8  Through a series of well-publicized books and articles, legal
13 Robert Park, Voodoo Science: The Road from Foolishness to Fraud viii-ix (Oxford U.
Press 2000).
14 Of course, objectivity in the courtroom depends on objectivity in the laboratory.
Judicial decisions evaluating scientific validity can be contaminated when the scientists
themselves are engaged in the business of advancing particular drug products or pet social
or political agendas. A scientist's personal or pecuniary interest in the outcome of an
experiment can taint the resulting data and, if exposed, his conclusions will not contribute to
the development of scientific knowledge. See e.g. Kurt Eichenwald & Gina Kolata, Hidden
Interest- A Special Report: When Physicians Double as Entrepreneurs, 149 N. Y. Times
Al (Nov. 30, 1999) (describing how financial links between interventional cardiologists and
medical device companies have corrupted the traditions of objective medical research and
review).
15 Br. of Amici Curiae in Support of Resps., at *5, Browner v. American Trucking Assns.
Inc., (No. 99-1257), 2000 WL 1298950 (explaining that "science seeks to supply verifiable
descriptions of, and explanations about, what is, rather than imposing judgments about what
should be") (emphasis added).
16 Id.
17 Atul Gawande, Under Suspicion, New Yorker 53 (Jan. 8, 2001).
18 According to Peter Huber:
Junk science is the mirror image of real science, with much of the same form but none
of the same substance. There is the astronomer, on the one hand, and the astrologist,
on the other .... [Junk science] is a hodgepodge of biased data, spurious inference,
and logical legerdemain, patched together by researchers whose enthusiasm for
discovery and diagnosis far outstrips their skill. It is a catalog of every conceivable
kind of error: data dredging, wishful thinking, truculent dogmatism, and, now and then,
outright fraud.
Peter W. Huber, Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom 2-3 (BasicBooks 1991).
Although Peter Huber is widely credited with coining the term "junk science," ironically
Galileo's Revenge has sometimes been dismissed as "junk social science" for its reliance on
anecdotes and other factual inaccuracies. See e.g. Jeff L. Lewin, Calabresi's Revenge: Junk
Science in the Work of Peter Huber, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 183 (1992) (criticizing both Huber's
legal and scientific analysis). For other recent works addressing the "junk science"
phenomenon from various perspectives, see, e.g., Park, supra n. 13; Michael Shermer, Why
People Believe Weird Things: Pseudoscience, Superstition, and Other Confusions of Our
Time (W.H. Freeman & Co. 1999) (distinguishing science from "pseudoscience"); Marcia
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scholars and scientists have focused academic discourse, and public outrage,
on the "junk scientist"-the expert witness who "seeks to present grossly
fallacious interpretations of scientific data or opinions that are not supported by
scientific evidence."' 19 Diatribes against the junk scientist are replete with
fantastic examples of the vast influence of bogus science on the American
judicial system. In addition, concern about junk science in our social and
political dialogues has influenced lawmakers and the courts. 20 These academic
and public debates have been further fueled by the advent of well-publicized
mass tort litigation. For example,
[o]ver the past 20 years, the public's attention has been caught in rapid
succession by asbestos, diethylstilbestrol (DES), Bendectin, the Dalkon
shield, Agent Orange, Alar-treated apples, radon, and electromagnetic
fields, among other real or alleged health hazards. Each engendered a
mix of fear, recriminations, and denials. There were also mass lawsuits,
Congressional hearings, and demands for tighter government regulation.
The scientific evidence was highly variable .... [However,] [t]he strength
of the evidence seemed irrelevant to the public debate. Risks for which
there was little evidence were taken as seriously as those for which there
was good evidence, and small risks received as much attention as large
ones.
2 1
The problem of science that is misused or misunderstood by judges,
lawyers, and jurors is real.22 The "junk science" debate, however, ignores the
Angell, Science on Trial: The Clash of Medical Evidence and the Law in the Breast Implant
Case (W.W. Norton & Co. 1996) (noting the effects of "pseudoscience" on both the popular
mind and the courts).
1' Kenneth R. Foster & Peter W. Huber, Judging Science: Scientific Knowledge and the
Federal Courts 17 (MIT Press 1999).
20 See Breyer, supra n. 3, at 4 (citing Galileo's Revenge and explaining that "[tihe law
must seek decisions that fall within the boundaries of scientifically sound knowledge"); see
also Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (1993) ("[S]ubmission to the scrutiny of the scientific
community... increases the likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be
detected.").
21 Marcia Angell, Evaluating the Health Risks of Breast Implants: The Interplay of
Medical Science, the Law, and Public Opinion. 334 New Eng. J. Med. 1513,1517 (1996);
see also Joseph Sanders, Scientifically Complex Cases, Trial by Jury, and the Erosion of
Adversarial Process, 48 DePaul L. Rev. 355, 359 (1998). Sanders states:
Given the limited evidence now available, one cannot conclude with certainty that the
"mean difficulty" of expert testimony in civil cases has gone up. What is more certain
is that the absolute number of "hard" cases has increased. Moreover, many of these
cases have two other attributes that have magnified their significance. First, many have
involved mass torts .... Second, and not unrelated, many of the cases have been tried
in federal courts.
Id.
22 Although some bad science results from the use of unethical professional expert
witnesses, much of the science deemed too "bad" for legal use has perfectly ethical bases.
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range of scientific mistakes and misunderstandings that permeate the law.
Junk science is neither the source nor the scope of the problem among
scientists, legal scholars, and practitioners. Instead, the junk science debate is
merely a byproduct of an adversarial system that too often fails to seek
practical methods to enhance communication and collaboration with
disciplines outside the law.23
This Article offers a specific response to Justice Breyer's charge that judges
"must aim for decisions that, roughly speaking, approximately reflect the
scientific 'state of the art.' ' 24  To that end, the Article addresses the
impediments to developing consistent legal standards governing the
admissibility of scientific evidence by offering two analytic tools, one legal
and one scientific. This Article then demonstrates how these tools can be used
to evaluate scientific evidence.
Part I presents the first tool: a new interpretation of Kumho positing that the
Daubert admissibility test has been significantly altered by Justice Breyer to
place the exploration of scientific validity squarely in the context of a
relevance inquiry. The first section begins the case and rule analysis by tracing
the development of the admissibility standard from Daubert through Kumho.
The second section explores Justice Breyer's specific response to the problems
created by Daubert in Kumho Tire Company v. Carmichael. The third section
examines how Kumho is emblematic of Justice Breyer's personal jurisprudence
and is intended as a model of proper judicial inquiry into scientific
admissibility.
Part II of the Article provides the second tool: a hands-on presentation of
basic scientific terminology, methodology, and statistical concepts to be used
in conjunction with the new test. The first section aims to develop a scientific
lexicon for the law by demonstrating that a new test alone cannot meet Justice
Breyer's charge. In response, this section offers guidance for interpreting the
critical scientific terminology that has been imported into the current legal
standard by the Supreme Court. The second section provides practical
information intended to improve our comprehension of basic scientific
methodology. The third section identifies and explains certain fundamental
statistical concepts essential to our comprehension of all empirical data.
Part III of the Article integrates both tools to demonstrate our legal limits by
showing how an improved admissibility standard and enhanced scientific
The high regard for science in the popular imagination undoubtedly arises from the fact
that ordinary textbook science is usually true. But much of the science that the
layperson encounters in the mass media ... doesn't come from the textbooks. It is, at
best, frontier science-the scientific equivalent of an experimental aircraft that may or
may not someday be robust enough to fly.
Foster & Huber, supra n. 19, at 159.
23 Id. at 17 ("Junk science is a legal problem, not a scientific one. It is cultivated by the
adversarial nature of the legal proceedings, and it depends on the difficulty many people
have in evaluating technical arguments.").
24 Breyer, supra n. 11.
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sophistication will help us identify scientific evidence that is so technical or
complex that accurate evaluation requires outside assistance. Using these
tools, we can begin crafting creative interdisciplinary solutions.
I. HONING THE LEGAL TOOLS
A. The Supreme Court Develops an Admissibility Test for Scientific Evidence
1. Daubert Creates a New Role for the Court
The Daubert plaintiffs were two children born with serious birth defects
allegedly caused when their mothers took the prescription antinausea
medication Bendectin while pregnant. 25 At trial, the plaintiffs presented eight
scientific experts who testified to a causal connection between Bendectin and
the childrens' birth defects. These experts based their conclusion on in vitro
(test tube) and in vivo (live animal) studies that found a causal link,
pharmacological studies that showed similarities in the chemical structure of
Bendectin and other known teratogens, 26 and the experts' reanalysis of
published human epidemiological studies. 27 The defendant's epidemiologist
testified that based on a review of all of the relevant epidemiological literature,
not one scientific study had found that Bendectin was a human teratogen.28
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, holding that
the scientific expert evidence offered by the plaintiffs did not satisfy the Frye29
25 Bendectin was introduced in 1957 by Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals as a remedy for
morning sickness, and it was eventually used by more than 33 million women. Foster &
Huber, supra n. 19, at 2. The Daubert case should be understood in its historical context as
one of more than 1,900 Bendectin cases filed from 1977 to 1988. Jay P. Kesan, An Autopsy
of Scientific Evidence in a Post Daubert World, 84 Geo. L. J. 1985, 2004-05 (1996)
(reasoning that Merrell Dow kept winning at trial and on appeal because the plaintiffs'
experts had not sought formal scientific review for their Bendectin research results). For an
extensive review of the medical literature discussing Bendectin, see Robert L. Brent,
Bendectin: Review of the Medical Literature of a Comprehensively Studied Human
Nonteratogen and the Most Prevalent Tortogen-Litigen, in 9 Reproductive Toxicology 337
(1995).
26 A "teratogen" is a substance capable of causing malformations in fetuses. Daubert,
509 U.S. at 582 (1993).
27 Id. at 583.
28 Id. at 582.
29 The courts first recognized a special rule for the admissibility of scientific evidence in
the 1923 case of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Frye, the defense
attempted to admit the results of a systolic blood pressure detection test as exculpatory
evidence, and it presented scientific testimony to support the belief that a person's blood
pressure will rise when he or she is not telling the truth. The D.C. Court of Appeals upheld
the trial court's refusal to admit the defendant's scientific evidence on the ground that the
systolic blood pressure deception test had not gained "general acceptance" as a method of
assessing truth telling. Id. at 1014. In a frequently-quoted passage, the Frye court held that
1040 [Vol. 81:1033
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test because it was not generally accepted in the field of human
epidemiology. 30 In a two-page decision by Judge Alex Kozinski, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment and upheld the
application of the Frye test.3 1
When Daubert reached the Supreme Court, the threshold question was
whether the Frye "general acceptance test" for the admissibility of scientific
evidence could logically coexist with the more recently enacted Federal Rules
of Evidence. 32 Justice Blackmun, with the backing of the entire Court, quickly
concluded that the Frye test, which used "general acceptance" as a surrogate
for reliability, had not survived the adoption of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence. 33 Although the Court could have remanded the case to the Ninth
when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and
demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.
Id. Thus, under Frye, courts played a limited role in the qualitative assessment of scientific
expert testimony. They only needed to identify the relevant scientific discipline and then, if
the theory or technique was "generally accepted" within that community, the testimony had
to be admitted. The "general acceptance" standard did not die with Frye, as it has been
incorporated into the Daubert analysis. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 ("Widespread
acceptance can be an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible."); see also
Standards and Procedures for Determining the Admissibility of Expert Evidence After
Daubert, 157 F.R.D. 571, 572 (1994) (describing how the "general acceptance" standard
allowed judges to defer to the scientific community and avoid the difficulties of evaluating
confusing and technical information outside the court's area of expertise).
30 According to the District Court, the plaintiffs' experts' non-epidemiological evidence
was inadmissible in light of the large amount of epidemiological evidence available. See
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 572-75 (S.D. Cal. 1989), rev'd,
509 U.S. 579 (1992). The plaintiffs' epidemiological evidence was found unpersuasive
because it reanalyzed existing data and had not been published or subjected to peer review.
Id.
31 Judge Kozinski explained that three circuits that had considered similar cases had
found the plaintiffs' experts' studies "particularly problematic in light of the massive weight
of the original published studies supporting the defendant's position, all of which had
undergone full scrutiny from the scientific community." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129-30 (9th Cir. 1991).
32 The parties in Daubert advanced conflicting arguments about which rule applied if the
Court abandoned the Frye test. The plaintiffs argued that the Federal Rules of Evidence
should be interpreted to admit all relevant testimony proffered by a qualified expert. The
defendant, Merrell Dow, argued that any new rule fashioned by the Court must evaluate the
reliability of the conclusions proffered by the scientific expert. See Michael H. Gottesman,
The Randolph W. Thrower Symposium: Scientific and Technical Evidence: Admissibility of
Expert Testimony After Daubert: The "Prestige" Factor, 43 Emory L.J. 867, 869 (1994).
3 According to the Court, "a rigid 'general acceptance' requirement would be at odds
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Circuit without further comment, Justice Blackmun instead created a new
"gatekeeping" role for the judge confronted with proffered scientific
evidence. 34 Daubert is based on the assumption that the trial judge can and
should screen scientific evidence so that the jury will not hear evidence unless
it is both reliable and relevant. As one observer has noted:
Daubert's underlying rationale is a sound one: lay jurors should not be
exposed to unfiltered scientific or technical testimony that may adversely
influence their findings of fact. But this rationale is based on two
underlying assumptions: (1) that the trial judge is more knowledgeable in
assessing complex scientific testimony than is the average lay juror, and
(2) that each judge brings to the specific task of gatekeeping a general
attitude or philosophy concerning the level of scrutiny appropriate for
scientific gatekeepers. 35
The Daubert Court required federal trial judges first to determine if an expert's
testimony is "scientific knowledge" before opening the gate to admit the
evidence at trial.36  Thus, "scientific knowledge" 37 replaced "general
with the 'liberal thrust' of the Federal Rules [of Evidence] and their 'general approach of
relaxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion' testimony." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588 (citations
omitted). In addition, by 1993, the Court was aware of the widespread perception that the
Frye test was used to exclude reliable scientific expert testimony that related to novel or
developing scientific theories or techniques. See e.g. Kristina L. Needham, Student Author,
Questioning the Admissibility of Nonscientific Testimony After Daubert: The Need for
Increased Judicial Gatekeeping to Ensure the Reliability of All Expert Testimony, 25
Fordham Urb. L. J. 541, 544-545 (1998) (noting that the "Frye test was overly
conservative.., because expert testimony based upon a newly developed methodology was
rendered inadmissible if it was not generally accepted"); Graham, supra n. 8, at 322 (noting
that, as a practical matter, Frye was applied only to new or novel forensic evidence offered
by the government in criminal cases).
34 Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, Thomas,
and White in his creation of the judicial gatekeeper, while Justices Rehnquist and Stevens
dissented. It should be noted that the immediate response among the federal judiciary to
Daubert was generally negative. In the words of one commentator,
[m]any federal judges believe Daubert has made their lives more difficult. They are
going to have to give a more reasoned statement about why they are letting in evidence.
They can't do it on a rubber stamp basis the way that some of them did it in the past.
Sherman, supra n. 9, at 3. See also sources cited supra n. 9 (describing the judicial
discomfort that followed Daubert).
11 Walsh, supra n. 3, at 1.
36 See Daubert 509 U.S. at 590 (stating that "the subject of an experts' testimony must be
'scientific knowledge').
37 "Scientific knowledge" is defined only vaguely by the Daubert Court as "an inference
or assertion.., derived by the scientific method." Id. at 590. Justice Blackmun defines
"scientific method" as scientific knowledge that "implies a grounding in the methods and
procedures of science." Id. at 589-90. In addition, the Court notes that "[s]cientific
methodology today is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be
falsified; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes science from other fields of human
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acceptance" as the proper standard.
According to Justice Blackmun, judges must decide whether to admit or
exclude scientific evidence based on the scientific reliability of the proffered
testimony and its relevance. 38 The Court defined the judicial inquiry as
"flexible," noting that "[i]ts overarching subject is the scientific validity-and
thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability-of the principles that underlie a
proposed submission." 39 The judge's focus, according to the Court, "must be
solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions they generate." 40
To assist judges who would now need to distinguish between reliable and
unreliable scientific evidence, Justice Blackmun outlined four "flexible
guidelines": (1) testability; (2) peer review and publication; (3) error rate; and
(4) general acceptance. 41 Under the first guideline, a scientific theory must be
testable through scientific methodology.42 Scientific knowledge is based upon
generating hypotheses and testing them to see if they can be falsified, or
proven untrue; indeed, this methodology is what distinguishes science from
other fields of human inquiry.43 Under the second guideline, the scientific
inquiry." Id. at 593 (citations omitted).
" See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 (explaining that the trial judge must ensure that all
scientific testimony or admitted evidence is not only relevant but reliable).
39 Id. at 594-95.
0 Id. at 595. Four years after Daubert, the Court acknowledged that the task of
separating principles, methodology, and conclusions was not as simple as they had
previously assumed. See Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (concluding
that in science "conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another").
41 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94.
42 Id. at 593. Testability is critical to the Court's analysis. However, the Court fails to
provide future judges with any criteria or standards that might be used by courts to assess
the testability of a particular scientific theory. Instead, Blackmun combines the concepts of
testability and peer review, noting that "submission to the scrutiny of the scientific
community is a component of 'good science,' in part because it increases the likelihood that
substantive flaws in methodology will be detected." Id.
"3 Id. To support this criterion, the Daubert Court specifically referenced the highly
influential work of scientific theorist Karl Popper. Id at 593-94 (quoting Popper's
observation that "the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or
refutability, or testability"). Popper believed that scientific propositions must be framed so
that contradiction by other scientists is possible. Thus, scientific theories that have
withstood the criticism of other scientists should be adjudged as more reliable than those
that cannot be tested. See Foster & Huber, supra n. 19, at 19 (discussing Popper's view of
scientific falsifiability); see also Gottesman, supra n. 32, at 876.
The 'testability' notion comes from the demands of pure sciences, such as physics or
astronomy. In these fields, scientists are seeking enduring truths, and will settle for
nothing less than certainty .... The 'error rate' notion comes at the other end of the
spectrum, where explorations are so mechanical that it is actually possible to identify
whether there is a correlation between the methodology's findings and the observable
world.
Gottesman, supra n. 32, at 876.
20011 1043
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
theory or technique must have been subjected to peer review and publication to
allow other scientists to detect possible substantive flaws in the methodology. 44
The third guideline focuses the judge on the known or potential rate of error of
a particular scientific technique 45 and the "existence and maintenance of
standards controlling the technique's operation." 46 Finally, the Daubert Court
resurrected the Frye standard by stating that "[w]idespread acceptance can be
an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible, and 'a known
technique which has been able to attract only minimal support within the
community'... may properly be viewed with skepticism.
47
Daubert effected a radical change in doctrine and practice. In the years
since Daubert, however, lawyers, judges, and legal scholars have paid little
attention to the inherently problematic structure of the Daubert test itself. The
two-part Daubert test requires judges first to determine the general validity of
any proffered scientific expert testimony. "This first prong of the Court's
analysis thus requires judges to critique scientific evidence and separate the
wheat of valid scientific methodology from the chaff of chicanery. '48
According to the Court, assessing general scientific reliability must precede a
judicial determination of whether the evidence "fits" the facts at issue.49
Requiring judges to engage in a broad inquiry into scientific reliability before
they determine whether proffered scientific evidence "fits" the facts at hand
can distort the admissibility decision by appearing to expand the role of the
44 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (stating that the "submission to the scrutiny of the
scientific community is a component of 'good science,' in part because it increases the
likelihood that substantive flaws in methodology will be detected.").
15 Once again the Daubert Court failed to provide any specific criteria for a judge
confronting the task of assessing the "known or potential error rates" of a particular
scientific methodology. See id. at 594 (stating merely that "the Court ordinarily should
consider the known or potential rate of error"). The Court does not explain the concept of
error rate even at the most basic level (i.e., false positives versus false negatives). These
difficulties can be compounded by the fact that different scientific disciplines frequently
have different methods of estimating error rates. See Erica Beecher-Monas, A Ray of Light
for Judges Blinded by Science: Triers of Science and Intellectual Due Process, 33 Ga. L.
Rev. 1047, 1054 (1999) (describing the variance in error calculation among different
scientific disciplines).
46 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
47 Id. at 594; see also Daniel J. Capra, The Daubert Puzzle, 32 Ga. L. Rev. 699, 705
(1998) (explaining that the Daubert Court's continued reliance on general acceptance and
peer review assures that scientific evidence that would have satisfied Frye will be deemed
admissible while scientific evidence that attracts limited support from the relevant scientific
community is likely to be deemed inadmissible (citations omitted)).
48 Erica Beecher-Monas, Blinded by Science: How Judges Avoid the Science in Scientific
Evidence, 71 Temp. L. Rev. 55, 62 (1998) (discussing the preliminary assessment
requirement of the Daubert test).
" Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93 (explaining that the judge must determine the scientific
validity of an expert witness's testimony before applying the reasoning and methodology to
the case at hand).
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court beyond consideration of relevant evidence. This is particularly
problematic when a judge must focus on the unfamiliar world of science.
Despite having been immediately criticized for imposing an unwieldy burden
on the federal courts, the Daubert test remained essentially unchanged for the
next five years.
2. United States v. Scheffer: The Bastard of Daubert's Progeny
a. Defining the Outer Limits of Science
Although normally excluded from academic discussions of Supreme Court
doctrine on science and law, U.S. v. Scheffer 5° reveals the Court's conception
of the boundaries of legitimate science. In 1992, Edward Scheffer was
working as an informant for the Air Force Office of Special
Investigations.("OSI"). 51  As a condition of his employment, Scheffer was
required to provide urine samples and submit to polygraph examinations. 52 On
April 17, 1992, OSI requested a urine sample; three days later Scheffer
submitted to a polygraph examination.53  According to the polygraph
examiner, "the test 'indicated no deception' when Scheffer denied using drugs
since joining the Air Force. '54 Scheffer was arrested on May 13, 1992, for
being absent without leave, and subsequently, his April 17, 1992, urine sample
tested positive for methamphetamine.55
Scheffer was tried by general court martial. At this proceeding, he was
barred from introducing the results of his polygraph examination by Military
Rule of Evidence 707 ("MRE 707"), which contains a per se exclusion of
polygraph evidence in military court martial proceedings. 56 Basing his defense
on a theory of innocent ingestion, Scheffer denied having knowingly ingested
the methamphetamine while working for OSI.57 On cross-examination, the
prosecutor attempted to impeach Scheffer with prior inconsistent statements. 58
In closing argument the government stated, "He lies. He is a liar. He lies at
every opportunity he gets and he has no credibility." 59 He was convicted and
10 523 U.S. 303, 312 (1998).
51 Id. at 305 (1998).
52 See id. (stating that Scheffer's supervisor informed him that he would periodically be
tested).
13 See id. at 306.
14 See id.
51 See id. at 306-07.
56 See id. at 306.
57 See id (providing the relevant portion of MRE 707).
58 See id. at 306 n. 1
59 See id. (explaining that Scheffer introduced the polygraph evidence to corroborate his
belief that he had not ingested methamphetamine); see also Robin D. Barovick, Between
Rock and a Hard Place: Polygraph Prejudice Persists After Scheffer, 47 Buff. L. Rev. 1533,
1547 n. 66 (1999) (noting that the government called Scheffer a liar or stated that his
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sentenced to thirty months of confinement, a bad-conduct discharge, total
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and reduction to the lowest enlisted
grade. 60 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces found MRE
707 unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment because it precluded a
criminal defendant from admitting exculpatory evidence in response to a direct
attack on his credibility.61
In the plurality opinion written by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court
reversed the Sixth Circuit and concluded that MRE 707 was constitutional. 62
Despite the fact that Daubert had received a flurry of attention only five years
earlier, Justice Thomas essentially ignored Daubert and applied a Frye-type
test.63 The Court's reliance on Frye is demonstrated by the fact that the
plurality opinion focused solely on the level of acceptance of polygraph test
results in the scientific community. 64 According to Justice Thomas, a per se
exclusion of polygraph results, without any effort by the judge to evaluate the
scientific validity of the test, was acceptable because "the scientific community
remains extremely polarized about the reliability of polygraph techniques. '65
The Scheffer Court concluded that science has boundaries, and since polygraph
test results fall outside the boundaries of science, they can be excluded by the
legislature without employing a Daubert analysis.
In a concurring opinion, drafted by Justice Kennedy and joined by Justices
O'Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, these four justices agreed that the polygraph
technique was unreliable and that per se exclusion of a scientifically unreliable
technique did not raise constitutional concerns. 66 However, Justice Kennedy
specifically recognized the "tension" between the Daubert rule and the
credibility was lacking twenty-one times during closing argument).
60 See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 307.
61 See U.S. v. Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442, 445 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (holding that a per se exclusion
of polygraph evidence violated the Sixth Amendment rights of an accused when offered to
rebut an attack on credibility).
62 See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 309 ("[Rule 707 does not] implicate a sufficiently weighty
interest of the defendant to raise a constitutional concern under our precedents.").
63 See id. at 310.
64 It seems particularly strange that Daubert was ignored when just the previous term, the
Court reaffirmed Daubert and stated that the appropriate standard for the trial court's
findings on the relevance and reliability of scientific evidence is abuse of discretion. See
generally Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142 (1997) (reaffirming Daubert and
discussing the role of the court in reviewing a trial judge's decision to allow expert
testimony).
65 See Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 309-10 (1998) (comparing studies that have found polygraph
tests reliable against those declaring them unreliable).
66 Id. at 318 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (The "good-faith disagreement among experts and
courts on the subject of polygraph reliability counsels against our invalidating a per se
exclusion of polygraph results .... I agree the rule of exclusion is not so arbitrary or
disproportionate that it is unconstitutional.").
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Scheffer holding.67 Despite stating that "the rule of exclusion is not so
arbitrary or disproportionate as to be unconstitutional," Justice Kennedy
expressed several reservations about the decision, including the belief that a
different case might have presented an even more compelling case for the
admissibility of polygraph test results.68
b. Scientific Evidence Offered by the Criminal Defendant
In addition to marking the Court's delineation of the outer limits of
legitimate science, Scheffer highlights the unique concerns that arise when a
criminal defendant offers scientific evidence as exculpatory evidence. The
Scheffer plurality held that "Rule 707 does not implicate any significant
interest of the accused. '69 The Court reasoned that the fact that Scheffer had
testified in his own defense barred him merely from introducing expert opinion
testimony based on polygraph test results to establish his own credibility.70
The constitutional implications of the per se exclusion of exculpatory evidence
offered by a criminal were the focus of a vigorous dissent by Justice Stevens.
Justice Stevens's dissent emphasized the defendant's Sixth Amendment
argument by citing numerous Supreme Court decisions describing the
constitutional right to present a defense as fundamental to the due process of
law. To support his dissent, Justice Stevens noted that the Scheffer plurality
had ignored the Court's longstanding concern for "potential injustice produced
by rules that exclude entire categories of relevant evidence that is potentially
unreliable. '71  The question of whether enhanced constitutional concerns
should alter a judge's assessment of scientific evidence offered by a criminal
defendant has not been widely discussed.72 At a forum on scientific evidence,
Chief Justice Ellen A. Peters of the Connecticut Supreme Court characterized
the issue from a judge's perspective. She explained that DNA testing, since it
more reliably excludes suspects than it includes suspects, is more likely to be
67 Justice Kennedy wrote:
I doubt, though, that the rule of per se exclusion is wise, and some later case might
present a more compelling case for introduction of the testimony than this one does.
Though the considerable discretion given to the trial court in admitting or excluding
scientific evidence is not a constitutional mandate, ... there is some tension between
[the Daubert] rule and our holding today.
Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 316-17 (noting that Scheffer, who was allowed to testify on his own behalf, was
barred only from introducing expert testimony).
70 See id. at 317.
71 Id. at 327 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72 But see Gottesman, supra n. 32, at 877 (suggesting that different burdens of proof for
civil and criminal trials should affect the admissibility standard for scientific evidence).
"The civil law requires that parties establish their points only by a preponderance of the
evidence, and not beyond a reasonable doubt. The standards for admitting expert testimony
must be calibrated to that proof standard." Id.
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probative and useful when introduced by the defense than when offered by the
State. 73 More recently, a commentator advocated the use of a conservative
approach when faced with "new 'scientific' technology and theories that have
not been generally accepted by the relevant scientific community-especially
where the so-called expert is testifying against the defendant in a criminal
case."
74
The Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence specifically recognizes that
judicial reluctance to provide expert assistance to indigent criminal defendants
may complicate a Daubert analysis, especially when the prosecutor relies on a
novel scientific theory or methodology. 75 Both the Federal Rules of Evidence
and case law, however, provide blanket rules for all proponents of scientific
evidence. Thus, the prevailing assumption is that "[t]he standard of [scientific]
reliability, whatever it is, will be the same for criminal and civil cases, the
same for injunctive cases (simply ordering a party to do or not to do
something), and cases in which monetary compensation is sought. ' 76
3. General Electric Co. v. Joiner: Refining the Role of the Court
In 1997, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in General Electric Co. v.
Joiner77 to resolve the question left open by Daubert of the appropriate
standard for appellate review of a trial court's decision to admit or exclude
scientific evidence. In Joiner, the plaintiff claimed that exposure to
polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs") had caused his lung cancer. 78 To support
his claim, the plaintiff offered four epidemiological studies that purportedly
established a causal link between defendant's PCBs and plaintiffs cancer.79
The district court reviewed the plaintiffs four studies and found that: (1) the
first study did not conclude that PCB's had caused lung cancer among the
workers they examined; 80 (2) the second study found that there was a slightly
increased incidence of lung cancer among workers at a PCB plant, but that the
increase was not statistically significant; 81 (3) the third study did not mention
71 Judicial Panel Discussion on Science and the Law, supra n. 2, at 1131-37 (quoting
Chief Justice Ellen Peters) (discussing whether the same admissibility test is appropriate for
both exculpatory and inculpatory evidence).
71 Capra, supra n. 47, at 703 (arguing that scientists are better equipped to assess the
reliability of expert testimony than are judges).
71 See generally Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, supra n. 3.
76 Foster & Huber, supra n. 19, at 135 (noting that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not
distinguish between different legal contexts).
77 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
78 See Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp. 1310, 1314 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
79 See id. at 145.
80 See Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 145 (1997) (referring to the conclusions of the district
court).
8' See id.
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PCB's;82 and (4) the fourth study subjects had been exposed to numerous
potential carcinogens. 83 After excluding all of plaintiff's scientific expert
testimony, the district court granted summary judgment for the defendant. The
Eleventh Circuit used a "stringent standard of review" to reverse the district
court.
84
The Joiner decision, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that abuse of
discretion is the appropriate standard of review for all evidentiary rulings,
including the exclusion of scientific expert testimony.85 Accordingly, the
Eleventh Circuit was reversed for applying the wrong standard. In Joiner, the
Court also continued to expand our understanding of the proper admissibility
standard, noting that scientific "conclusions and methodology are not entirely
distinct from one another. ' 86 Finally, Justice Rehnquist cautioned judges
attempting to apply the Daubert test that "nothing in either Daubert or the
Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence
that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. '87 Judges
applying Joiner, therefore, must now assess the scope of the "analytic gap
between the data and the opinion proffered" to determine if there is a
sufficiently close correlation for the evidence to be admitted.88
B. Justice Breyer Creates a New Admissibility Test for Scientific, Technical,
and Other Specialized Evidence
Just one year after deciding Joiner, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael 89 to decide a question that had split the
federal circuit courts. The debate centered on whether the Daubert test applied
exclusively to "scientific" testimony or if it governed the admissibility of all
expert testimony, including "technical" or "specialized" knowledge. 90
1. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael 91
In 1993, the Carmichael family was involved in a highway accident after the
right rear tire on their family minivan failed.92 The undisputed cause of the
82 See id. at 146
83 See id.
84 See id. at 141-43.
" See id. at 143.
86 Id. at 146.
87 See id. at 145.
88 Id. at 146.
89 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
90 See id at 147.
91 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (reasoning that the Daubert rule is not limited to scientific expert
testimony because Federal Rule of Evidence 702 grants the district judge the discretionary
authority to determine the reliability of even nonscientific expert testimony in light of the
circumstances of the case).
92 Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1514, 1516 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (stating
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blowout was tire separation, which occurs when the tread of a tire separates
from the inner tire carcass. 93 The Carmichaels subsequently filed suit against
the tire manufacturer and its distributor.94
The Carmichaels hired George Edwards as an expert witness to testify about
tire defects. 95 Edwards determined that, because the tire failure did not result
from negligent maintenance by the Carmichaels, there must have been a defect
in either the tire's design or its manufacture. 96 Edwards never testified,
however, because he fell ill before the defendants could depose him. Dennis
Carlson, one of his employees, replaced Edwards as the plaintiffs' expert.97
Carlson held a master's degree in mechanical engineering and had spent ten
years testing tires for Michelin Americas Research and Development.98 He
agreed with Edwards that a defect in the manufacturing of the tire, rather than
in its maintenance, caused the accident.99 During his deposition, Mr. Carlson
opined that tire failure was caused by "poor or insufficient adhesion between
the rubber, steel, and nylon components of the tire."' 00  His methodology
consisted of a four-part visual examination of the tire in which he looked for
"(1) greater tread wear on the shoulder than in the center of the tire; (2)
sidewall deterioration or discoloration; (3) abnormal bead grooving on the tire;
and (4) rim flange impression,"'' 1 to determine if over-deflection caused the
tire failure. Carlson found that two of these four conditions were present and
concluded that a design and/or manufacturing defect was to blame, not over-
deflection. 0 2 After deposing Carlson, the defendants moved to exclude his
that the facts of the case were undisputed). All seven family members suffered injuries and
one died. Id.
93 Id. at 1519.
9 Id. at 1517 (noting while the Carmichaels sued the manufacturer, Kumho, as well as
two distributors, they could not produce evidence that established the actual distributor of
the tire at issue).
9' Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433, 1434 (1 1th Cir. 1997), rev'd sub
nom. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
96 Id. ("Edwards concluded that a defect in either the tire's design or its manufacture
caused the blowout.").
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1434 n. 2.
99 According to Carlson, the tire separation was caused by either "over deflection" or a
defect in the manufacturing process. Carmichael, 923 F. Supp. at 1519. Over deflection
results from either under-inflation of the tire or overloading of the tire, both of which cause
the tire to bear too much weight, which in turn causes a chemical breakdown in the tire. See
id. at n.5.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 As Carlson testified, "when we look for the indicators of... over deflection.., and
eliminate those as a possible cause, then there is nothing else but a manufacturing defect."
Id. at 1519. The district court noted that there was nothing inherently wrong with a process-
of-elimination form of proof per se, as long as the underlying methods used were
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opinion as inadmissible because it did not meet the reliability requirement
established by Daubert.103 The district court agreed, finding that Carlson's
opinion satisfied none of the four admissibility criterion listed in Daubert. 104
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court and held that
Daubert applied only to scientific expert testimony and not to expert testimony
based on personal observations or experience. 10 5 Writing for the Eleventh
Circuit, Judge Birch stated that "Daubert does not create a special analysis for
answering questions about the admissibility of all expert testimony" but rather
"provides a method for evaluating the reliability of witnesses who claim
scientific expertise." 10 6  Judge Birch found that Carlson's testimony was
nonscientific because Carlson based his opinions on personal experience and
observations rather than scientific principles and methodology. 107
Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in applying
Daubert to Carlson's testimony.10 8
The Supreme Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit, holding that the reliability
requirement set forth in Daubert applied to all expert opinion testimony
whether "skill- or experience-based."' 1 9 Following this preliminary decision
scientifically valid. Id. at 1520 n. 7.
103 Id. at 1519-20 (stating that the defendant's rooted their collective motion for summary
judgment partly on the ground that Carlson's testimony was inadmissible).
104 Id. at 1521.
105 See Carmichael, 131 F.3d at 1436 (holding that Daubert applies only to "scientific"
testimony and not to "technical" or "specialized" testimony, thereby drawing a distinction
within Federal Rule of Evidence 702).
'06 Id. at 1434 (quoting U.S. v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir. 1996)). In Sinclair,
the Court explicitly limited the application of Daubert to "scientific" testimony. Sinclair, 74
F.3d at 757.
107 Carmichael, 131 F.3d at 1436 (finding that Carlson's expertise resulted from years of
looking at mangled tires, not from any specific theory of physics or chemistry).
108 Id.
109 Id. at 151. In fact, the Court specifically acknowledges that when an expert witness's
expertise is based solely on experience, some of the Daubert rule's questions can help
evaluate the reliability of the testimony. Id. Thus, one of the critical questions that Kumho
resolved was the applicability of the Daubert admissibility test to nonscientific expert
testimony. The Kumho Court noted that Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence makes
no "relevant distinction" between scientific knowledge and nonscientific knowledge. Id.
According to the Kumho Court, trial courts should apply the Daubert factors "where they
are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony," regardless of whether the
expert is a scientist. Id. at 152. The difficulties that courts may face in applying the
Daubert test to nonscientific expert testimony is beyond the scope of this Article and has
been addressed by others. See e.g. K. Isaac deVyver, Opening the Door but Keeping the
Lights Off.- Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael and the Applicability of the Daubert Test to
Nonscientific Evidence, 50 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 177 (1999); Kimberly M. Hrabosky,
Kumho Tire v. Carmichael: Stretching Daubert Beyond Recognition, 8 Geo. Mason L. Rev.
203 (1999); see also J. Brook Lathram, The "Same Intellectual Rigor" Test Provides an
Effective Method for Determining the Reliability of All Expert Testimony, Without Regard to
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requiring judges to "gatekeep" for all proffered expert testimony envisioned by
Federal Rule of Evidence 702,110 the Kumho Court clarified that the four
reliability factors described in Daubert are not applicable in all cases."'
Justice Breyer then proceeded to do what Justice Blackmun had failed to do in
Daubert: develop a new scientific admissibility standard and apply it to the
specific facts of the case at hand. 112
In Kumho, Justice Breyer engaged in a thorough and detailed assessment of
the precise scientific tests, methodologies, and conclusions that the plaintiffs
presented to the district court.1 3 This reanalysis required the Supreme Court
to unearth and evaluate numerous case-specific facts that supported the district
court's determination that plaintiffs' expert evidence was inadmissible. 114 For
example, according to Justice Breyer, plaintiffs (1) failed to provide the district
court with any evidence that other experts in this field would have used the
same two factor analysis employed by Carlson, (2) did not establish that tire
experts generally made the types of distinctions upon which Carlson based his
opinion, and (3) failed to provide the district court with any reference to, or
support for, Carlson's methodology in any relevant publications." 5 Justice
Breyer's detailed reevaluation of the underlying facts is an effort to model the
admissibility inquiry that trial judges must undertake when they perform their
gatekeeping roles.
On its face, Kunho appears to do nothing more than restate the test
developed in Daubert to govern the admissibility of scientific evidence.
Accordingly, Kumho has been widely cited in judicial and scholarly
discussions as affirming Daubert, with the caveat that it expanded the Daubert
gatekeeping role to include testimony by all experts with scientific, technical,
or other specialized non-empirical knowledge, 116 and added the requirement
Whether the Testimony Comprises "Scientific Knowledge" or "Technical or Other
Specialized Knowledge," 28 U. Mem. L. Rev. 1053 (1998).
110 The Court noted that Rule 702 "makes no relevant distinction between scientific
knowledge and technical or other specialized knowledge" and "applies its reliability
standard to all ... matters within its scope." Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,
147 (1999).
... See id. at 150.
The conclusion, in our view, is that we can neither rule out, nor rule in, for all cases
and for all time the applicability of the factors mentioned in Daubert, nor can we do so
for subsets of cases categorized by category of expert or by kind of evidence. Too
much depends on the particular circumstances of the particular case at issue.
Id.
12 Id. at 153.
113 See id. at 153-58 (reanalyzing in detail Carlson's specific methodology in light of the
court's opinion).
114 See id.
I" See id. at 157 (examining the record and finding no indication that other experts in the
industry use Carlson's test or methodology).
116 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Taxonomy of Testimony Post-Kumho: Refocusing
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that an expert employ "the same level of intellectual rigor" in the courtroom as
in her field of research. 17 Close examination, however, reveals that Justice
Breyer's majority opinion in Kumho is a significant clarification of Daubert
that shifts the focus of the judicial admissibility inquiry. In fact, Kumho is
intended to transform and improve judicial decision-making in cases that
involve science, technology, or other areas of specialized knowledge.
As discussed above, Daubert created a two-step test to govern the
admissibility inquiry for scientific evidence.' 18 The first step requires judges
to determine whether the expert testimony is "scientific knowledge."'"19 This
step appears to demand that judges first assess the general theoretical and
methodological reliability/validity of proffered scientific evidence. The second
step, which must follow a finding that the evidence is "scientific knowledge,"
requires judges to decide whether the evidence "fits," or is relevant to, the facts
at issue.120
There are two inherent structural problems with the placement and apparent
requirements of the first step of Daubert that have been unrecognized by courts
or commentators despite the flurry of critique that followed this decision.' 21
The first is a problem of interpretation. Requiring non-scientist judges first to
determine whether proposed expert testimony is "scientific knowledge," before
exploring the relevance of the testimony to the facts at hand, seems to distort
the admissibility decision by forcing the judge to focus on a potentially infinite
amount of evidence that is probably irrelevant to the dispute at hand. The
second problem is one of application. Judges attempting to implement
Daubert may mistakenly assume that because they have little experience or
expertise interpreting and evaluating competing scientific theories or
methodologies, they should admit all but the most patently bogus, scientific
evidence and allow the jurors to resolve discrepancies as questions of
weight. 122
on the Bottomlines of Reliability and Necessity, 30 Cumb. L. Rev. 185, 209 (2000) (noting
that prior to Kumho, "the objective validity of a non-scientific expert's premises was
essentially exempt from any scrutiny"). According to Imwinkelried, "Kumho not only
establishes that Daubert is still good law; it also expands the scope of the Daubert doctrine.
In particular, Kumho announces that Daubert's reliability/validation standard applies to all
types of expert testimony, non-scientific as well as scientific." Id. at 211.
117 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152.
"' See supra Part I(A) (discussing the two-step test created in Daubert).
119 According to Justice Blackmun, "[flaced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony,
then, the trial judge must determine at the outset... whether the expert is proposing to
testify to (1) scientific knowledge .... Daubert, 509 U.S. 592 (describing the first step of
the Daubert test).
120 The Daubert Court identified the second step of the inquiry as determining whether
the "scientific knowledge ... will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in
issue." Id. at 592.
121 See supra n. 9 (discussing the scholarly criticism of Daubert).
122 The Advisory Committee Notes to the May 2000 amendments to Federal Rule of
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A careful reading of Kumho indicates that Justice Breyer was likely
motivated by judges' problems understanding and applying Daubert. More
specifically, Justice Breyer implicitly acknowledged in the majority opinion
that the first (general reliability/validity) step of Daubert may have imposed an
insurmountable hurdle for the federal courts. This reading of Kumho is
supported by Justice Breyer's almost exclusive focus on the second step of the
Daubert test, the fit/relevance prong.
[T]he specific issue before the [district] court was not the reasonableness
in general of a tire expert's use of a visual and tactile inspection, [but was
instead] the reasonableness of using such an approach ... to draw a
conclusion regarding the particular matter to which the expert testimony
was directly relevant. 23
Thus, according to the Kumho majority, a properly conducted admissibility
inquiry should focus on the fit/relevance of the proffered evidence. 124
This restructuring of the admissibility standard places the assessment of
scientific validity squarely within the context of a relevance inquiry, thereby
providing future courts with a more familiar and readily implemented standard.
Using this newly reformulated test, the Kumho Court concludes that "the
question before the trial court was specific, not general[:]... the trial court had
to decide whether this particular expert had sufficient specialized knowledge
to assist the jurors 'in deciding the particular issues in the case."' 125
This Article's interpretation of Kumho, as a significant reformulation of
Daubert, is further supported by the concurring opinion by Justices Scalia,
Thomas, and O'Connor. It is particularly notable that these justices appear to
disagree with the majority's refocusing of the admissibility inquiry to
emphasize relevance and eliminate or diminish the Court's inquiry into more
general questions of scientific reliability/validity. 126 Justices Scalia, Thomas,
and O'Connor concluded that the district court properly excluded testimony
Evidence 702 addressed this concern by noting that "[a] review of the case law after
Daubert shows that the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule."
See David L. Faigman, et al., "How Good is Good Enough?: Expert Evidence Under
Daubert and Kumho," 50 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 645, 665 (2000) (finding that "in the
forensic context, courts have long admitted a surfeit of expertise with little or no evaluation
of the foundation upon which the opinion rests."); Jay P. Kesan, Symposium Drug
Development: Who Knows Where the Time Goes?: A Critical Examination of the Post-
Daubert Scientific Evidence Landscape, 52 Food Drug L.J. 225, 239-40 (1997) (reviewing
numerous post-Daubert cases and concluding that "the quantum of scientific information
that must undergird an expert's methodology to render it scientifically valid and admissible
under Daubert is quite minimal").
123 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 153.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 156 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (articulating that whether Carlson's
method's were ever appropriate was not at issue).
126 Id. at 158.
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from plaintiff's expert. 127 In their view, however, the Kumho decision simply
upheld the lower court's broad and general "discretion to choose among
reasonable means of excluding expertise that is false and science that is
junky."128
Thus, the concurring opinion in Kumho demonstrates that at least three
members of the Court did not share Justice Breyer's conclusion that the lower
court decision did reject, or should have rejected, a bad fit between potentially
valid scientific theory and methodology and the specific facts before that court.
Instead, Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and Thomas understood Kumho as the
Court's imprimatur on the district court's conclusion that, in a general sense
and under the first step of Daubert, plaintiffs expert's testimony was junk
science.
2. Subsequent Decisions from the Federal Courts Support a New Kumho
Admissibility Test
The significance of Justice Breyer's reformulation of the Daubert inquiry is
just beginning to manifest itself in decisions of the federal courts. In January
2000, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Brumley129 became the first of the
circuit courts to explicitly acknowledge that Kumho had refocused the Daubert
admissibility inquiry on the second fit/relevance step of the Daubert test. 130
According to the Seventh Circuit, "[t]he Supreme Court in Kumho Tire
explained that the Daubert 'gatekeeper' factors had to be adjusted to fit the
facts of the particular case at issue, with the goal of testing the reliability of
the expert opinion."' 31 In September 2000, the Seventh Circuit once again
concluded that Kumho had transformed the Daubert test. 132 In doing so,
however, the court added the bizarre limitation that the new Kumho test
applied only to technical testimony, and not to expert testimony based on
scientific or other specialized knowledge. 133 Kumho specifically belies this
distinction. 34 Hopefully the Seventh Circuit will excise this feature from its
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 217 F.3d 905 (7th Cir. 2000).
130 Id. at 911.
131 Id. (emphasis added).
132 "[W]ith respect to technical testimony, the 'Supreme Court in Kumho explained that
the Daubert 'gatekeeping' factors had to be adjusted to fit the facts of the particular case at
issue, with the goal of testing the reliability of the expert opinion."' NutraSweet Co. v. X-L
Engineering, 227 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Brumley, 217 F.3d at 91 l(emphasis
added).
133 See id at 788 (alleging that Kumho explained only how the Daubert test should apply
with respect to technical testimony).
131 "[Ilit would prove difficult, if not impossible, for judges to administer evidentiary
rules under which a gate-keeping obligation depended upon a distinction between
'scientific' knowledge and 'technical' or 'other 'specialized' knowledge." Kumho, 526 U.S.
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otherwise accurate reading of Kumho as it develops its doctrine.
In addition to these Seventh Circuit decisions, the Sixth Circuit, in May
2000, specifically noted that "[tihe Supreme Court in Kumho indicated that the
standards set forth in Daubert, depend[] on the particular circumstances of the
particular case.. .. ,,"31 More recently, the Southern District of New York
embraced a similar reading of Kumho when it noted, in February 2001, that the
Kumho Court was "less absorbed.., in formulating general rules for assessing
reliability.., and more concerned about directing judges to concentrate on the
particular circumstances of the particular case at issue."' 36 In fact, Judge
Sweet, writing for the district court, supported his decision by citing the
Federal Judicial Center's conclusion that Kumho demonstrated that the Court is
concerned more with focusing judges on the particular facts at issue in each
case than on taxonomy of expertise. 137
Recent decisions from other federal circuit and district courts also support
this reading of Kumho. In Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. Beelman River
Terminals, Inc., 38 the Eighth Circuit emphasized the Kumho requirement of
fit/relevance, finding that "it is the responsibility of the trial judge to determine
whether a particular expert has sufficient specialized knowledge to assist jurors
in deciding the specific issues in the case."'139 In Berry v. Crown Equipment
Corp., 140 a Michigan federal district court defined the post-Kumho role of the
district judge as follows:
The court is to examine not the qualifications of a witness in the abstract,
but whether those qualifications provide a foundation for a witness to
answer a specific question. Thus, the trial court must determine whether
the expert's training and qualifications relate to the subject matter of his
proposed testimony. The trial court has to decide whether this particular
expert has sufficient specialized knowledge to assist the jurors in deciding
the particular issues in the case. 141
In 1999, a Wisconsin federal district court articulated a similar emphasis on
the fit/relevance component of the Kumho test in National Football League
at 148. While Kumho dealt with technical testimony, the Court made clear that its thinking
should apply equally to scientific testimony.
135 U.S. v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 314 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Kumho Tire Co., 526
U.S. 150, to note that while the Daubert test has not been abandoned, it must be flexibly
applied).
136 Primavera Familienstifung v. Askin, 130 F.Supp.2d 450, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(quoting Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, supra n. 3, at 21 (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
137 See id.
138 254 F.3d 706 (8th Cir. 2001).
"' Id. at 715 (citing Kumho, 526 U.S. at 156, and examining whether the expert at issue
qualified as an admissible expert with respect to the particular issues at hand).
140 108 F. Supp. 2d 743 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
141 108 F. Supp. 2d 743, 749 (quotations and citations omitted).
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Properties, Inc. v. Prostyle, Inc.142 In that case, the court noted that after the
Kumho and Daubert decisions, non-case-specific information standing alone
does not sufficiently assist the jury to warrant admittance at trial. 43 At least
four additional federal district courts have relied upon similar relevance/fit
based analyses to decide questions of scientific admissibility.144 Together,
these cases confirm a shift in the federal courts' reading of Kumho. This new
reading reflects the primacy of a fact-specific emphasis and a movement away
from the general validity step of the Daubert test.
C. The Influence of Justice Breyer's Personal Jurisprudence
[Nleither the difficulty of the task nor any comparative lack of
expertise can excuse the judge from exercising the "gatekeeper"
duties .... 145
The Kumho Court's restructuring of Daubert is not accidental, nor is it a
coincidence that Justice Breyer authored this influential decision. It may be
impossible to ever discern the exact scope of Justice Breyer's influence on the
Kumho decision. It seems safe to assume, however, that Justice Breyer used
his influence as author of the majority opinion to guide the Court's analysis.
Justice Breyer is the only member of the Court repeatedly to express his belief
that the legitimacy and accuracy of legal decision-making is threatened when
courts misunderstand or misuse science. 146  Thus, any interpretation of
142 57 F. Supp. 2d 665 (E.D. Wis. 1999).
143 57 F. Supp. 2d 665 at 672 (quoting the U.S. Supreme Court in Kumho) ("The question
before the trial court was specific, not general. The trial court had to decide whether this
particular expert had sufficient specialized knowledge to assist the jurors in deciding the
particular issues in the case.").
" See Meineker. v. Hoyts Cinema Corp., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8846 (N.D. N.Y. June
25, 2001) ("Ultimately, the court must determine whether the expert has sufficient
specialized knowledge to assist the trier of fact in deciding the particular issues in the
case."); Sittig v. Louisville Ladder Group LLC, 136 F. Supp. 2d 610 (W.D. La. 2001)
(stating that experts must have a "degree of knowledge, skill, experience, or training to
testify about [the case specific issues]"); Rothfos Corp. v. M/VNuevo Leon, 123 F. Supp. 2d
362 (S.D. Tx. 2000) (concluding that Kumho recognized the Daubert test must always be
fact specific); Grdinich v. Bradlees, 187 F. Supp. 2d 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that the
expert must have "specialized knowledge to assist the jurors in deciding the particular issues
in the case"); Gray et al v. Briggs, 45 F. Supp. 2d 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (arguing that expert
testimony must help determine "particular issues in the case").
141 Joiner, 522 U.S. at 148 (Breyer, J., concurring) (providing a preview of his strong
interest in questions of science and law).
146 Breyer stated:
This [Daubert] requirement will sometimes ask judges to make subtle and
sophisticated determinations about scientific methodology and its relation to the
conclusions an expert witness seeks to offer-particularly when a case arises in an
arena where the science itself is tentative or uncertain, or where testimony about
general risk levels in human beings or animals is offered to prove causation.
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Supreme Court doctrine on questions involving science and law must consider
the powerful influence of Justice Breyer's personal jurisprudence in light of his
oft-repeated goal of achieving more effective interdisciplinary integration.'47
The Kumho opinion is replete with evidence that Justice Breyer's personal
jurisprudence heavily influenced the Court's analysis. It also appears that
Justice Breyer may have used an instrumentalist approach to achieve what he
thought best for the federal courts. For example, Justice Breyer has
characterized the Kumho district court opinion as focused "not [on] the
reasonableness in general of the [scientific evidence],"'148 but instead on the
"reasonableness of using such an approach ... to draw a conclusion regarding
the particular matter to which the expert testimony was directly relevant."' 49
This description of the trial court's conclusions, which provides the foundation
for his opinion, is simply not accurate. In addition, Justice Breyer's
assumption that the district court limited its analysis to the narrow issue of
"whether [the] particular expert had sufficiently specialized knowledge to
assist jurors in deciding the particular issues in the case,"' 50 is similarly
unsupported. In contrast to the Supreme Court's assertions, the trial court in
Kumho actually had engaged in a fairly routine and formulaic application of
Daubert, focusing primarily on the first (general validity) step of the Daubert
test. 151 According to the district court,
[t]his Court's Daubert analysis illustrates that none of the criteria set forth
by the Supreme Court for admissibility of scientific evidence under Rule
702 have [sic] been satisfied in this case. The Daubert Court assigned to
trial courts "the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a
reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand." The Court has a
responsibility to serve as a gatekeeper, ensuring that purportedly expert
testimony does not reach a jury unless that testimony is reliable and
reasonable. 52
Thus, the Kumho district court's ultimate conclusion emphasized the more
general concerns of the first prong of the Daubert test, scientific
reliability/validity, and gave short shrift to the second prong of the Daubert
test, evidence of relevance or fit.
Id. at 147-48 (concluding that judges must adeptly handle science related areas to ensure
that the truth will be ascertained).
141 See examples supra nn. 3, 11.
141 Kumho, 526 U.S. at 153 (stating that the issue facing the court was not, as the
respondents alleged, whether the tire expert's methods were generally acceptable).
141 Id. (emphasizing the importance of a fact-specific analysis of testimony).
10 Id. at 156 (characterizing the question faced by the trial court as specific, not general).
"I' See Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1514, 1520-21 (S.D. Ala. 1996)
(outlining and subsequently applying the four reliability factors suggested in Daubert as
helpful to determining general scientific validity).
152 Id. at 1522 (citations omitted) (finding testimony too unreliable, speculative, and
attenuated to be admissible).
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Another indication that the Kumho majority's conclusion may reflect the
influence of Justice Breyer's personal jurisprudence is the fact that most of the
discussion in the majority opinion is wholly unnecessary to the resolution of
the question raised by the Eleventh Circuit. The fact that the majority
addressed issues beyond the narrow question of whether Daubert applied to
technical expert testimony did not escape Justice Stevens, who dissented from
much of the majority opinion. According to Justice Stevens, the Court should
have simply held that "the District Court's decision in this case-not to admit
certain expert testimony-was within its discretion and therefore lawful." 153
Justice Stevens also criticized the Court's decision to reach out to decide
questions not raised by the certiorari petition as unfair to litigants. 154 In light
of this criticism, it is reasonable to interpret Justice Breyer's application of his
reformulated test to the facts before the district court as an attempt to provide a
model of judicial inquiry for lower courts to follow. 155
To the extent that problems understanding and implementing Daubert have
been caused or exacerbated by the admissibility test created in that case,
Justice Breyer has offered future judges a possible solution through the new
test created in Kumho. It is also clear, from Justice Breyer's writings and
comments, that Kumho reflects his personal jurisprudence. Moreover, this
decision appears to symbolize a specific pragmatic solution to a cumbersome
and divisive problem.156 At the same time, the creation of a new Kumho test
reveals the following irony: although Justice Breyer himself clearly respects
the scientific process, he recognizes that the law does not proceed on the
scientific model, any more than science proceeds on the legal model. In fact,
law is sometimes best advanced by the most unscientific method of all, the
deliberate realignment of basic principles and mechanisms to reflect the
priorities and jurisprudence of a single powerful percipient individual.
"I Kumho, 526 U.S. at 142 (1999) (granting district courts broad latitude in deciding
how to determine reliability).
114 Id. at 159 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (contending that the court should not indulge in
excessive dicta in cases such as Kumho).
55 A recent case from the Sixth Circuit appeared to recognize that Justice Breyer has set
the standard for assessing the judicial inquiry when, citing Kumho, the court engages in a
thorough assessment of plaintiff's expert's science and methodology. See United States v.
Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 315 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that the Supreme Court's Kumho
decision considered the district court's possible examination of the Daubert factors).
56 Professor Richard J. Pierce, Jr., has examined Justice Breyer's extensive writings in
an effort to characterize his judicial philosophy. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Justice Breyer:
Intentionalist, Pragmatist, and Empiricist, 8 Admin. L. J. Am. U. 747 (1995). According to
Professor Pierce, Justice Breyer is a "dedicated pragmatist" who, during his confirmation
hearings, described his goal as making law work for people. Id. at 748. Professor Pierce
also concludes that Justice Breyer has a "deep respect for contextual facts" and that "[h]is
normative prescriptions are invariably contingent on contextual facts." Id. at 750. This
view of Justice Breyer, as a jurist focused on the practical implementation of law to specific
facts is wholly consistent with the Court's approach in Kumho.
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On its own, a new admissibility standard takes us only part of the way
towards more effective integration of science into law. Justice Breyer recently
wrote that the most "obvious" impediment to the developing interdependence
of science and law is the fact that "judges lack the scientific training that might
facilitate the evaluation of scientific claims or the evaluation of expert
witnesses who might make such claims."'157 To alleviate this problem, legal
scholars and practitioners who must use science to understand or adjudicate
legal questions will need to develop an understanding of basic scientific
terminology, methodology, and statistical analysis.
I. HONING OUR SCIENTIFIC TOOLS
A. Developing Our Scientific Sophistication
In spite of centuries of attention by scientists and philosophers of
science, no concise definition of science has ever been accepted by
the community of scientists and scholars.158
In 1999, Justice Breyer, with the backing of a majority of the Supreme
Court, provided the federal judiciary with a new test intended to guide the
courts on questions involving the admissibility of scientific, technical, and
other specialized evidence. This test, while certainly an improvement over
Daubert, is not enough.
Basic scientific language, 159 theory, and methodology are not only foreign,
but may be an anathema to lawyers familiar with legal rhetoric, jurisprudential
theory, and the process of adjudication. It should be obvious that legal
scholars and practitioners must enhance their scientific sophistication to
understand and resolve cases that involve scientific evidence. In fact, Daubert
and its progeny require that judges assess scientific reliability and direct the
judicial inquiry to factors such as scientific testability, peer review and
publication, and error rates. 160 As one commentator has observed:
Many people have become alienated from science and the scientific habits
of thought-at a time when we need science more than ever to help us
find our way though an increasing number of serious and complicated
"' Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, supra n. 3, at 4.
158 Shermer, supra n. 18, at 164.
"I Many of the problems that lawyers have with science may be attributed poor
interdisciplinary communication. See e.g. Gina Kolata, Health Care Advice: A Matter of
Cause, Effect and Confusion, N. Y. Times at Dl, D6 (April 25, 2000) (describing the
difficulties in communication and comprehension between scientists and nonscientists).
"Scientists and the public alike use words like 'prevents' and 'protects against' and 'lowers
the risk of when they are discussing evidence that is suggestive, and hypothesis-generating,
as well as when they are discussing evidence that is as firm as science can make it." Id.
'1 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594 (discussing the factors relevant to the determination of
whether a particular method or technique is admissible).
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questions involving risks to health and safety. To reverse the alienation
we need a better public understanding of science.., including an
understanding of the nature of evidence, the concepts of chance and error,
and the value of skepticism.' 61
Judges should not use their scientific naivete to excuse a reluctance to engage
in a thorough analysis of the quality of proffered scientific evidence.
Circumventing the Daubert mandate to examine the underlying validity of
proposed expert testimony is all the more shocking because performing
the Daubert analysis is not difficult. There are judges who apply Daubert
routinely and well and whose rigorous standards should serve as a model
to those overwhelmed by their gatekeeping responsibilities.162
As Justice Breyer explained in his concurrence in Joiner:163
Of course, neither the difficulty of the task nor any comparative lack of
expertise can excuse the judge from exercising the 'gatekeeper' duties
that the Federal Rules of Evidence impose .... To the contrary, when
law and science intersect, those duties often must be exercised with
special care. 164
To understand fundamental scientific concepts, we do not need to become
amateur scientists. 165 This misconception, combined with a general fear of
things scientific, may be partially responsible for basic misunderstandings on
the part of many judges and lawyers involved in determining the admissibility
of scientific evidence.166
The first set of problems encountered in any attempt to better integrate
science into legal practice or legal analysis involves misunderstandings
between scientific and legal language. For example, problems frequently
161 Marcia Angell, Evaluating the Health Risks of Breast Implants: The Interplay of
Medical Science, the Law, and Public Opinion, 334 New Eng. J. Med. 1513, 1517 (1996)
(describing the frustration some feel when confronted with the inconsistent decisions in
cases relying on scientific evidence).
162 Beecher-Monas, supra n. 48, at 85 (providing examples of judges who have
effectively applied the Daubert test).
163 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147-50 (1997).
'64 Id. at 148 (Breyer, J., concurring).
165 See id. at 148 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[J]udges are not scientists and do not have the
scientific training that can facilitate the making of such [scientific] decisions."). Justice
Breyer believed that a lack of specialized scientific training should not keep judges from
fulfilling their gatekeeping duties. Id.
166 See Fed. R. Evid. 702 (advisory committee's note) ("A review of the caselaw after
Daubert shows that the rejection of expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule.");
Beecher-Monas, supra n. 48, at 58 (describing how judges try to avoid dealing with the
science that supports proffered scientific evidence). See also Kesan, supra n. 119, at 239-40
(reviewing numerous post-Daubert cases and concluding that a only minimal amount
scientific information must undergird an expert's methodology to render it scientifically
valid and admissible under the Daubert test).
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occur when non-scientists believe that something either causes-or does not
cause-a disease in a particular person. Accordingly, it should not surprise
anyone that three of the critical cases decided by the Supreme Court involving
questions of science and law turned on the plaintiffs' ability to demonstrate
causation. 167 The nonscientist's understanding of causation may be reinforced
by the legal questions that we seek to resolve and by our processes of
adjudication. Certain tort actions, for example, require the factfinder to
determine, by a preponderance of the evidence, whether exposure to
defendant's product caused plaintiff's injuries.168 Thus, lawyers and judges
appear to learn from experience that questions involving specific medical
causation, such as whether defendant's product caused plaintiffs injuries, are
proper and necessary to litigation.
To a medical scientist, the question of specific causation is not only
unanswerable; it is absurd. 169 Scientists never treat causation as a yes/no
question, nor do responsible ones believe that it is possible to use scientific
methods to determine individual causation. In fact,
good scientists rarely reach absolute conclusions. Particularly in medical
research, certainty is extremely hard to come by. Instead, medical
researchers almost always speak in terms of probabilities.... Very few
studies are by themselves definitive ... [and] [e]ven then, the studies
taken together merely add to the probability that the conclusion is correct,
without proving it absolutely. 70
Instead, scientists view questions of causation as measurements of risk. A
responsible scientist can never say with certainty that a defendant's product
caused a particular plaintiff's disease. As a result, misunderstandings and
miscommunications abound when the law asks for a finding of specific legal
167 See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 137; Joiner, 522 U.S. at 136; Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579. Each
case involves the attempted use of expert testimony to prove causation as well as the
subsequent legal arguments concerning the admissibility of such testimony).
168 Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, supra n. 3, at 32 (explaining that in toxic
tort cases, the causal mechanism is often unknown, so establishing causation involves using
scientific evidence to infer cause and effect). Id.
169 See Beecher-Monas, supra n. 45, at 1098-99 (describing the attempt to achieve
scientific certainty as "an unnecessary exercise in existential angst").
[N]o matter how persuasive epidemiological or toxicological studies may be, they do
not show individual, specific causation although they might enable a probabilistic
judgment about the association between a particular chemical exposure and human
disease on a population level.... Even if epidemiologists and toxicologists are able to
identify correlations between exposure to a given chemical and a disease, their
summary statistical statements apply only to the group studied, not to the individual
members of the group.
Id.
70 Angell, supra n. 18, at 96-97 (comparing seemingly contradictory elements of science
such as the presentation of objective evidence against the reluctance to use such evidence to
make absolute statements in individual cases).
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causation, while scientific causation can be expressed only as a mathematical
quantification of increased but generalized risk.
When Justice Breyer redefined "the relevant issue" of the Kumho inquiry to
be "whether the expert could reliably determine the cause of this tire's
separation," he may have inadvertently increased the gap between scientific
and legal definitions of causation."'7 Scientific notions of causation encompass
the concept of uncertainty and are necessarily generalized predictions of
increased risk. Thus, by focusing on an expert's ability to determine the cause
of a particular event, the Kumho Court could theoretically widen the
interdisciplinary gap by creating a false expectation that experts can testify to
specific causation based on inferences derived from scientific studies.172
The second problem that we encounter when we attempt to use science to
resolve legal disputes arises from disparities between legal and scientific
processes. As one commentator observed:
[L]aw and science represent two strikingly different ways of thinking,
which reflect their different methods. The law frames questions in
adversarial terms, and lawyers see problems as best resolved by
controlled argument. In contrast, the scientific method is (ideally) not
adversarial, but cooperative, and scientists usually find answers in the
slow accumulation of evidence from many sources. The different ways of
thinking are so ingrained that they may be virtually unconscious. 173
Lawyers and judges are generally comfortable asking and answering questions
in a legal environment governed by the requirements of representation,
evidentiary and procedural rules, and stringent time limits. This may seem odd
to scientists, some of whom view the litigation process as uncomfortable,
unfamiliar, and unlikely to generate valid results. Scientists' problems with the
legal process arise, in part, because science is less constrained by the
requirement of immediate and final decision-making. 174 Most scientists, in
"I Kumho, 526 U.S. at 154.
172 This raises the question of whether those attempting to narrow the gap between
science and law might argue for a different approach to civil liability focused on the
question of whether, as a society, we should continue to punish toxic tort defendants for
causing discrete injury to individual plaintiffs (which can never be determined with
scientific certainty). Perhaps the punishable act at issue should be the act that can be
established with some degree of scientific certainty-defendant's willingness to increase the
generalized risk of a particular harm an a broader level. This approach may be explored, for
example, in large class action lawsuits where the factfinder's focus is more diffuse.
Although cleaving or distancing legal responsibility from causation may raise other
problems, our current practice, to the extent that it attempts to establish individualized harm,
may sometimes rest on nothing more than a convenient legal fiction.
173 Angell, supra n. 18, at 28-29 (explaining what happens when the scientific mind
encounters the courtroom).
174 Scientists, unlike judges and lawyers, generally have the luxury of time, which likely
improves the quality of their conclusions. See Foster & Huber, supra n. 19, at 83 (noting
that the scientific process sets forth numerous "erroneous" discoveries in the process of
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their own fields, are permitted to pursue knowledge in the relative anarchy of
collaborative discussion, with time for debate and an expectation of peer-
review of new theories and developments.175
A third problem arises when nonscientists are uncomfortable or unfamiliar
with the core statistical concepts that underlie all empirical data. Judges are
routinely asked to understand statistics, and while they do not have to become
expert statisticians, they are expected to familiarize themselves with statistical
analysis. 76 Failure to do so has a negative impact on the legal decision-
making process. This problem can be alleviated if we recognize that many
legal decisions actually involve probabilistic reasoning and, at the same time,
we attempt to improve our understanding of basic statistical concepts. 177
As Justice Breyer recently explained, "[tihe search is not a search for
perfection, nor is it even a search for scientific precision. A judge is not a
scientist and a courtroom is not a scientific laboratory." 178  It is overly
simplistic, however, to assume that acquiring a basic understanding of
scientific jargon, methods, or statistics will enable us to assess the scientific
validity of all proposed expert testimony. Not only will some cases be too
technical or complex for judges and lawyers to comprehend, but science is so
reaching a plausible one). In the opinion of one commentator, "[t]he much-praised reliability
of science occurs only in the long term; in the short term, science is as flawed, as error-
prone, and as subject to manipulations and intellectual passions as any other human
activity." Id.
175 The Daubert decision itself acknowledges that
there are important differences between the quest for truth in the courtroom and the
quest for truth in the laboratory. Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual
revision. Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly.... [The]
Rules of Evidence [are] designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic
understanding but for the particularized resolution of legal disputes.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596-97.
176 Justice Breyer described the recent burden on the Supreme Court, with respect to
statistics as follows:
In each of these two cases [Hunt v. Cromartie, 199 S.Ct. 1545 (1999) and Dept. of
Com. v. U.S. H. of Reps., 119 S. Ct. 765 (1999)], we judges were not asked to become
expert statisticians, but we were expected to understand how that statistical analyses
worked. Trial judges today are asked routinely to understand statistics at least as well,
and probably better.
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, supra n. 3, at 2. Legal scholars and practitioners
attempting to acquire a basic understanding of statistics might look at Hans Zeisel & David
Kaye, Prove It with Figures: Empirical Methods in Law and Litigation (1997).
177 For an example of an effort to assist judges manage cases involving scientific issues,
see generally Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, supra n. 3.
178 Associate Justice Stephen J. Breyer, Speech, "The Interdependence of Science and
Law" (Association for the Advancement of Science Annual Meeting and Science Innovation
Exposition, Feb 16, 1998) <http://aaas.org/meetings/1998/breyer98.htm> ("Courts must
avoid that kind of serious scientific mistake (which once led one court, for example, to hold
that dropping a can of orange juice caused breast cancer). They must aim for decisions that,
roughly speaking, approximately reflect the scientific state of the art.").
[Vol. 81:10331064
BEYOND THE POLEMIC AGAINST JUNK SCIENCE
broad that language and methodologies vary significantly across scientific
disciplines. 79 A better understanding of the proper admissibility inquiry,
combined with a basic understanding of scientific methodology, is merely a
first step. These tools will enable us to recognize the complex scientific
questions that require additional guidance to help us craft creative methods for
enhancing our integration of science into law.
B. Misunderstanding Critical Scientific Terminology
1. Why We Need to Understand Critical Scientific Terminology
Judges and lawyers need a basic understanding of the language of science.
This is of particular importance when a word has a vastly different meaning in
science than it does in law. Daubert and its Supreme Court progeny reflect
various attempts to import scientific terminology into the standards that govern
the admissibility of scientific evidence. Thus, without an elementary
understanding of critical scientific terms of art, we will be unable to
comprehend the proper standard of admissibility or make sense of proposed
testimony from scientific experts.
In Daubert, the Supreme Court instructed that, for scientific evidence to be
admissible, "[t]he subject of an expert's testimony must be 'scientific...
knowledge." ' 180 According to Justice Blackmun, "in order to qualify as
'scientific knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be derived by the
scientific method. Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate
validation-i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is known."' 181 Based on this
brief introduction to the concept of "scientific knowledge," the Court required
that future judges focus their admissibility inquiry on "the scientific validity-
and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability--of the principles that
underlie a proposed submission."'' 82
Daubert introduced the concepts of scientific "validity" and "reliability" to a
federal bench and bar that likely knew little of the precise scientific meanings
of these terms. Although Daubert appeared to equate scientific validity with
evidentiary relevance and also to demand an analysis based on reliable
scientific principles, subsequent decisions from the Court narrowed the judicial
focus to the requirement of scientific "reliability." In 1997, four years after
Daubert, Justice Thomas stated in United States v. Scheffer that "the exclusion
179 See Capra, supra n. 47 at 703 (contending that scientists in the field at issue are better
equipped to determine the reliability of complex scientific testimony than are most judges).
ISO Daubert., 509 U.S. at 589-90 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702) (articulating the benchmark
criterion of admissibility under Daubert).
181 Id. at 590 (discussing the meaning of "scientific knowledge" and its relationship to
results arrived at through the scientific method).
182 Id. at 594-95 (emphasis added) (commenting on the compatibility between the
Daubert test and the inherent flexibility of Federal Rule of Evidence 702).
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of unreliable evidence is a principal objective of many evidentiary rules." 183
The Scheffer majority attained this objective, without Daubert analysis, when
it relied upon "good faith disagreement among experts and courts on the
subject of polygraph reliability" to uphold a per se exclusion of polygraph test
results. 184 In 1999, the Kumho Court reiterated the significance of scientific
"reliability" when Justice Breyer noted that, after Daubert and Rule 702,
expert witnesses have "testimonial latitude unavailable to other witnesses on
the 'assumption that the expert's opinion will have a reliable basis in the
knowledge and experience of his discipline." 85
For judges and lawyers unfamiliar with scientific terminology, it may seem
reasonable for the Court to use the terms "reliability" and "validity"
interchangeably and without specific definition or differentiation. 186 The most
recent version of the American Heritage Dictionary defines "reliable" as
"yielding the same or compatible results in different clinical experiments or
statistical trials,"1187 while "valid" is defined as "producing the desired
results." 188 Thus, in common parlance there is no clear or obvious distinction
between these two terms. This cannot, however, end the inquiry for lawyers
and judges charged with understanding scientific expert testimony. Attaining a
thorough understanding of the current admissibility standard requires us to
learn how scientists use these terms to convey quite different concepts.
2. How to Improve Our Understanding of Critical Scientific Terminology
To a scientist, "reliability" and "validity" are terms of art that have different
and precise definitions. The difference between scientific reliability and
validity is belied by the Supreme Court's assertion in Daubert that "the
difference between.., validity and reliability may be such that each is
different from the other by no more than a hen's kick."'189 If the Supreme
183 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 309 (emphasis added) (discussing the purposes behind many
evidentiary rules).
"I Id. at 318 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (highlighting the general
disagreement among experts concerning polygraph reliability).
115 Kumho 526 U.S. at 148 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592).
186 In fact, the Daubert Court specifically noted that numerous sources focus on the
"reliability of evidence as ensured by the scientific validity of its underlying principles."
Daubert 509 U.S. at 595 n.12 (1993) (acknowledging that the term "reliability" has
specialized meaning within science that differs from evidentiary reliability). After
describing these different approaches within the literature, the Court refused to explain or
express an opinion on the particular details of such approaches. Id.
187 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1474 (4th ed., Houghton
Mifflin 2000).
188 Id. at 1899.
189 The Court's only effort to distinguish scientific reliability from scientific validity, and
explain the differences between the legal and common meanings of these terms, appears in a
footnote which reads, in part:
We note that scientists typically distinguish between 'validity' (does the principle
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Court's admissibility standard for scientific evidence ignores the profound
difference between scientific reliability and scientific validity, judges who try
to apply this standard to proffered scientific evidence will very likely be
confused. This confusion is engendered or exacerbated when legal
practitioners and scientists use the same words but have an inconsistent
understanding of their meaning. 190
We should begin by understanding that "reliability," the term used most
frequently by the Court as a proposed guide for judicial inquiry, 191 refers
specifically to the ability of a second scientist to reproduce the results of an
earlier experiment. 192 The proper distinction between scientific reliability and
the related concept of scientific validity has been described as follows:
As a term of art in science and statistics, reliability refers to the
reproducibility of data. A reliable test can be repeated under identical
circumstances and yield the same results. The results may be consistently
wrong, but that is an issue of validity, not reliability. 1
93
Thus,
[a] scale, for example, is reliable if it reports the same weight for the same
object time and again. It may not be accurate-it may always report a
weight that is too high or one that is too low-but the perfectly reliable
scale always reports the same weight for the same object. 194
support what it purports to show?) and 'reliability' (does application of the principle
produce consistent results?) .... "[T]he difference between accuracy, validity, and
reliability may be such that each is distinct from the other by no more than a hen's
kick.... In a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based
upon scientific validity."
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9 (citation omitted).
190 See Foster & Huber, supra n. 19, at 11l (suggesting that the Daubert opinion used the
lay meaning of reliability, i.e., the quality of being trustworthy, safe, or sure, without ever
considering the more precise scientific meaning of the word).
191 Justice Breyer recently described the post-Daubert role of the federal judiciary as
"determin[ing] whether purported scientific evidence is 'reliable'...." Reference Manual
on Scientific Evidence, supra n. 3, at 5.
192 See Foster & Huber, supra n. 19 at Ill (explaining the relationship between scientific
reliability and its underlying basis in experimental testability). The scientific definition of
"reliability" appears to be frequently confused with its legal definition. "Reliability" has a
precise meaning in law that is different from its scientific definition. Evidence is reliable if
it has sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to be presented to the jury for its consideration.
Mistaking scientific reliability for evidentiary reliability can lead to general confusion about
the quality of proposed scientific expert testimony and the proper standards of admissibility.
193 Foster & Huber, supra n. 19, at Il1 (stating that scientific reliability is not a surrogate
for the validity of experimental results). This same distinction is true in the social sciences.
See e.g. John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Science in Law 54-55 (4th ed. 1998)
(noting that reliability refers only to the consistency of test results).
194 Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, supra n. 3, at 102-03 (explaining scientific
reliability in terms of consistent measurements yielding reproducible results).
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Reliability is generally quantified through examination of the "sensitivity"
and "specificity" of a particular test. 195 Sensitivity represents the probability
that a test actually will detect the particular condition it was designed to
detect. 196 Thus, a sensitive test should yield very few false negative results
(i.e., failed attempts to identify those who have the condition), but it may yield
false positive results (i.e., identify the condition when it does not in fact exist).
Specificity is the probability that a test will detect only the particular condition
for which it was designed.197 Thus, a test with a high specificity should yield
very few false positive results, but it may yield false negative results. A
reliable test will ideally yield low rates of both false positive and negative
results. Unfortunately, the Daubert Court does little to explicate the proper
meaning or usage of "reliability" in the scientific context or elucidate the
underlying concepts of sensitivity or specificity. According to one
commentator,
[w]hat makes Daubert confusing is that it utilizes both meanings of
"reliable." The thrust of the opinion, including the listing of factors to be
considered, supports a conclusion that "gatekeeping" is a determination of
whether the explanative theory works.... At the same time, however,
Daubert states Rule 702 requires that an "expert's opinion will have a
reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of his discipline," which is
a reference to sufficient assurances that the explanative theory works. 98
In fact, the Court's post-Daubert focus on scientific reliability has been
misplaced.
The second term of art relied upon at times by the Court to construct its
admissibility inquiry is "validity." In the context of scientific research, validity
refers to the ability of a particular test to measure "what it purports to be
measuring."' 99  Reliability is just one component of validity and can be
distinguished from scientific validity, which depends on considerations outside
the test itself.200 One commentator explained the concept of scientific validity
'9' See Foster & Huber, supra n. 19, at 113 (simplifying scientific reliability into two
separate components, sensitivity and specificity).
196 See id. (explaining the concept of sensitivity through a hypothetical test designed to
detect a specific infection in individuals).
197 See id. at 113-14 (demonstrating the concept of specificity through the same
hypothetical test).
198 Graham, supra n. 8, at 336-37 (analyzing the Daubert Court's use of reliability as
both an indicator of sound scientific methodology and a surrogate for the related term of
scientific reliability).
199 Foster & Huber, supra n. 19, at 146 (citation omitted) (defining the term "validity"
within its scientific context). See also Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, supra n.3,
at 103 (describing a valid measuring instrument as one that measures what it is designed to
measure).
200 See Foster & Huber, supra n. 19, at 146 (articulating the relationship between
scientific validity and external considerations).
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as follows:
"Validity" is also a term of art in science... [that] relate[s] to the
connection between a theory or results of a particular study and the
empirical world.... [Thus,] validity depends instead on the concordance
between the theory by which one interprets data and how the inferences
drawn from the data are going to be used.201
For example, while a polygraph may reliably measure certain physiological
responses to stimuli, it is not considered valid as a lie detector unless
"increases in pulse rate, blood pressure, and the like are well correlated with
conscious deception." 202  Judges and lawyers assessing scientific validity
should also keep in mind that, in common parlance, we often assume that
theories are either valid or invalid. This is not true in science.
Scientific theories are almost never categorized as valid or invalid because
they are rarely wholly accurate or wholly inaccurate explanations of the
empirical world. Thus, we should also recognize that "'[v]alidity' in science is
not a binary attribute, like pregnancy." 203  Scientific validity is better
understood as a matter of degree rather than in absolute terms. If the court,
therefore, determines that the scientific reliability of a theory is low, then its
validity is suspect. A high level of reliability, on the other hand, does not
necessarily establish the validity of a particular scientific theory or test.
When legal scholars and practitioners learn to use critical scientific terms of
art with greater precision, they will quickly recognize that although a reliable
test will produce similar data in subsequent experiments, a test that is valid for
one purpose may not be valid for a different purpose. To paraphrase Justice
Blackmun's example in Daubert, we might devise a reliable system for
measuring the phases of the moon (that achieves consistent measurement
results). Although the test will be valid for a study of ocean tides, it is not
necessarily valid to measure the appearance of werewolves. 2°4
To understand and use science, judges and lawyers need to know more than
just that another experimenter can replicate a particular test. We need to know
whether a particular test assists in understanding natural phenomena relevant to
the resolution of a specific legal dispute.205 We must also understand that
201 Id. at 143-46 (explaining the connection between scientific validity and observations
concerning the empirical world).
202 Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, supra n. 3, at 103 (stating that a
scientifically reliable test does not necessarily yield scientifically valid results).
203 Foster & Huber, supra n. 19, at 17 (discussing the issue of scientific uncertainty and
the limited ability of science to speak in terms of absolutes).
204 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (demonstrating through an example that the scientific
validity of a test depends on the specific purpose for which it is used). See also David L.
Faigman, Legal Alchemy 69 (W.H. Freeman 2000) (describing how science that might be
very valuable in certain cases would be entirely irrelevant in others and that statistically
significant research results might have no practical significance).
205 An expert's own assertions can never establish either the reliability or the validity of
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"[d]etermining the validity of a [particular scientific] theory is not the same as
establishing its truth. .... -206 A valid theory is one that is logically reasoned
and consistent with known observations. Its validity lasts only until the time
when someone proves it wrong.207
C. Misunderstanding Basic Scientific Methodology
The legal system doesn't understand science .... I taught in law
school for a year. Believe me, there's no science in there at all.20 8
1. Why We Need to Understand Basic Scientific Methodology
In Joiner, Justice Breyer articulated the need for judges to understand basic
scientific methodology in order to perform their roles as evidentiary
gatekeepers. 209 Judges, and lawyers, must understand basic principles of
scientific methodology to assess the validity of proposed scientific expert
testimony.2 10 Daubert originally required that the judge's focus "must be
solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they
any scientific theory. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146 (1997) (stating that in science,
"conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another"). See also Aldrige
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 34 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1023 (D. Md. 1999) (discussing the
need for independent validation of expert methodology).
206 Foster & Huber, supra note 19, at 140 (emphasis added) (noting the temporal aspect
of scientific validity and the chance that a theory accepted today might be quickly refuted
tomorrow).
207 Id.
208 Gawande, supra n. 17, at 53 (quoting Gary Wells, Professor of Psychology at Iowa
State University, a leading expert on eyewitness testimony and research).
209 Gen. Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 147-48 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
According to Justice Breyer:
This [Daubert] requirement will sometimes ask judges to make subtle and
sophisticated determinations about scientific methodology and its relation to the
conclusions an expert witness seeks to offer-particularly when a case arises in an area
where the science itself is tentative or uncertain, or where testimony about general risk
levels in human beings or animals is offered to prove individual causation.
Id.
210 Michael H. Gottesman, the attorney who argued on behalf of the Daubert plaintiffs
before the Supreme Court, has suggested that "the prestige factor" potentially could
influence an admissibility decision. Gottesman, supra n. 32, at 878. Gottesman reasons
that:
When a highly-qualified scientist is testifying within the specialized field to which she
devotes her out-of-court career, her opinions should be admitted without further
inquiry. [Under these circumstances] it would be truly arrogant for a judge,
unschooled in the scientific discipline, to declare that the witness' life work is
predicated on a methodology that is unreliable.
Id. This theory does not seem to have received support from any court or any other
commentator.
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generate."' As the cases interpreting Daubert make clear, the admissibility
decision encompasses an evaluation of both the expert's methodology and the
expert's application of those methods to the facts at issue.212  For those
nonscientists daunted by the task of analyzing the scientific methodology
behind proffered evidence, Dr. Marcia Angell offers the following words of
encouragement:
The general approach [to scientific methodology] is easy to understand,
because it is largely a matter of common sense. If nonscientists had a
better feeling for the approach, they could gauge the probable strength of
many scientific claims while knowing very little of the technical details
on which they are based. 213
Post-Daubert decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court support the idea that it is
no longer appropriate for judges to focus solely on the soundness of an expert's
methods, while leaving questions involving the application of these methods to
the jury.214 Four years after Daubert, the Joiner Court emphasized that the
court must find some valid connection between the data that results from the
application of the methodology and the conclusions drawn from that data. As
the developing Supreme Court doctrine makes clear, judges must work to
uncover mistakes in both the scientific methodology and its application to the
particular facts of a case. 215  Errors in either task make the resulting
conclusions less valid and therefore more likely to be inadmissible. 216
Although it is somewhat difficult to provide a universally accepted
definition of the scientific method, scientists generally agree that the following
211 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (articulating the prominent role of scientific principles and
methodology in an admissibility decision). The Court acknowledged only four years later
that the task of separating principles, methodology, and conclusions may not be as simple as
they had previously assumed. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146 (stating that conclusions and
methodology are not entirely separate from each another in science).
212 See e.g. In re Paoli Railroad Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994)
(assessing the plaintiffs' expert's methodologies, which included physical exams, laboratory
tests, and differential diagnoses to conclude that the distinction between a methodology and
its application is no longer viable).
213 Angell, supra n. 18, at 91 (emphasizing that the easily accessible "broad outlines" of
scientific methodology can provide non-scientists with enough information to make
informed decisions).
214 See e.g. In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 745 (describing how after Daubert, ferreting out the
misapplication of the methodology is no longer within the province of the jury).
215 See id. (discussing the application of scientific methodologies to facts to yield an the
expert's conclusion).
216 "This is true whether the step completely changes a reliable methodology or merely
misapplies that methodology." In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 745 (explaining that the judiciary's
gatekeeping role under Daubert requires a judge to reject evidence that is inadmissible
because it has been misapplied to the facts of the case); see also Sanders, supra n. 21, at 372
(contending that often it is a combination of problems in the expert's testimony, rather than
any one single flaw, that leads to the ultimate decision to exclude).
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steps are components of scientific methodology:
Induction: Forming a hypothesis by drawing general conclusions from
existing data.
Deduction: Making specific predictions based on the hypothesis.
Observation: Gathering data, driven by the hypothesis that tells us what
to look for in nature.
Verification: Testing the predictions against further observations to
confirm or falsify the initial hypothesis. 217
The judicial inquiry should focus on the development of scientific hypotheses,
the processes and mechanisms of testing hypotheses, the statistical significance
of any research findings, and the development of scientific conclusions from
those findings. Legal scholars and practitioners should also understand the
importance and function of a null hypothesis and the standards for determining
statistical significance. Although this basic level of comprehension will not
make us scientists, it will help us begin to understand and evaluate proffered
expert testimony.
Finally, we should recognize that an assumption of expert objectivity
underlies the basic principles of scientific methodology. Over the years,
philosophical questions of scientific objectivity have generated academic
debate on the relationship between science and truth.218  The persistent
influence of the philosophy of science on the development of legal doctrine
should not be ignored. 219
In fact, Daubert and its progeny clearly reflect the considerable influence of
certain well-known scientific philosophers. Most notably, the Daubert Court
specifically referenced the highly influential work of scientific theorist Karl
Popper.220 Justice Blackmun's statement that "good science" encompasses
theories and techniques that have survived "submission to the scrutiny of the
scientific community" 221 reflects Popper's theory that valid scientific
217 Shermer, supra n. 18, at 19 (providing the basic elements of scientific thinking while
cautioning the reader that scientists do not conduct research using this rigid framework of
steps).
218 See e.g. Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, supra n. 3, at 69-75 (briefly
reviewing ideas of scientific objectivity in the works of Bacon, Popper, and Kuhn).
219 See Foster & Huber, supra n. 19, at 140 (acknowledging that "the connection between
science and truth is as philosophically contentious as the nature of science itself").
220 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94 (discussing the central role played by testability in
determining whether a theory or technique qualifies as "scientific knowledge").
221 Id. at 593 (describing the role of peer review and publication in the determination of
scientific validity as increasing the probability of the detection of methodological flaws).
The Court's understanding of scientific falsifiability was also likely influenced by the
theories of Thomas Kuhn. See Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2d
ed., U. of Chicago Press 1970). In this seminal book, Kuhn described how experimental
inconsistencies and contradictions do not immediately challenge the existing paradigm of
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propositions must be framed so that contradiction by other scientists is
possible.222 By referencing Popper's work in Daubert, the Supreme Court
placed special emphasis on Popper's belief that "[t]he criterion of the scientific
status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability.'2 23 Thus,
according to Popper and the views adopted by the Daubert Court, scientific
theories that have withstood the criticism of other scientists should be adjudged
more reliable, more scientifically valid, and therefore more likely to be
admitted in court, than those that cannot be tested or have been discredited by
further experimentation. 224
The assumption of scientific objectivity also raises questions involving the
effect of the human scientist. 225 The objectivity of any expert, or test results
relied upon by any expert, can be contaminated when hidden incentives
influence the collection and/or interpretation of scientific data.226 Critiques of
objectivity extend far beyond the exposure of biased experts, however, as
theories abound regarding the potential influence of culture, 227 race, gender, 228
or experience, for example, on human scientists. These theories, while
intriguing and sometimes provocative, should not be understood to prove that
science is incapable of assessing the validity of alternative hypotheses. 229 The
level of objectivity required for science to inform our understanding of the
empirical world is not absolute and critiques based upon relativism can never
excuse judicial passivity on questions involving scientific evidence.
scientific knowledge but in the aggregate can break with the paradigm and quickly bring
science in a new direction. Kuhn believes that scientific revolutions are "the tradition-
shattering complements to the tradition-bound activity of normal science." Id. at 6.
222 See Foster & Huber, supra n. 19, at 19 (discussing the central role of falsifiability in
Popper's theories. In a 1989 article analyzing the relevance of social science to legal
decision-making, Professor David Faigman discussed the importance of the falsifiability
standard to social science research that claims to be based upon objective knowledge. See
David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law
as Science and Policy, 38 Emory L.J. 1005, 1015 (1989) (stating that "[f]alsifiability or
testability represents the line of demarcation between science and pseudo-science").
223 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 (citation omitted) (articulating Popper's statement on the
importance of scientific falsifiability).
224 See id. (discussing Popper's view of scientific falsifiability).
225 See e.g. L. Laudan, Science and Values (Univ. of Cal. Press 1984).
226 See supra n. 17 (discussing investigative reporting that documented conflicts of
interest between interventional cardiologists and medical device companies).
227 See Angell, supra n. 18, at 179 (discussing various multicultural critiques of science).
221 See id. at 180-81 (discussing feminist critiques of science).
229 The fact that science can yield uncertain results does not mean that "'truth' is relative,
as a pernicious kind of postmodernism maintains." Foster & Huber, supra n. 19, at 16-17.
"Rather, it is to say that science has limited ability to answer questions of great social
importance." Id.
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2. How to Improve Our Understanding of Basic Scientific Methodology
To begin to understand the difference between the scientific and legal
processes, imagine what would happen if we attempted to import scientific
methods and processes into the judicial system. For example, if scientific
principles were applied to the criminal trial setting, a defendant could never be
acquitted unless the defense attorney could provide an explanation for all of
the defendant's actions and activities that was superior to the explanation
provided by the prosecutor. Having met this burden, the defense attorney
would then be required to explain away all possibly relevant events implicating
her client that the prosecutor did not discuss. Communications between the
defense attorney and her client and all materials relating to defense
investigations or strategies would be discussed in open court and scrutinized by
the prosecutor, the judge, and the jury. The jury would be comprised of
experts in relevant fields. Jurors would be allowed to discuss the proceedings
throughout, perform their own investigations, ask questions of all participants,
call their own witnesses, and hire their own experts. Litigants would have an
unlimited amount of time to present their cases and the jurors could arrive at
their decision whenever they chose. Finally, the jurors' verdict would be
expressed as an estimate, quantified in terms of statistical probabilities, of the
increased risk that a person with characteristics similar to the defendant under
similar circumstance, could have committed the charged crime.
The imaginary scientific courtroom is intended to highlight the vast
differences between legal and scientific methodologies. "In science, the
evidence leads to the conclusion; in the courtroom, the expert's conclusion
comes first and becomes the legal evidence. Not surprisingly, the answers
yielded by these two approaches may differ greatly. '230 According to Justice
Breyer,
the most obvious... [problem that judges and lawyers have with
scientific evidence] is that most judges lack the scientific training that
might facilitate the evaluation of scientific claims or the evaluation of
expert witnesses who make such claims. Judges are typically generalists,
dealing with cases that can vary widely in subject matter. Our primary
objective is usually process-related: seeing that a decision is reached
fairly and in a timely way.231
In light of the interdisciplinary procedural differences in procedures, a first
step toward improving the successful integration of science into the courtroom
is that we familiarize ourselves with the scientific process. 232 A general
230 Angell, supra n. 18, at 179-80 (explaining the fundamental differences between
science and the courtroom).
231 Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, supra n. 3, at 4.
232 The federal courts have begun to specifically recognize this obligation. See e.g.
Braun v. Lorillard, Inc., 84 F.3d 230, 235 (7th Cir. 1996) (agreeing with Daubert that a
familiarity with the scientific process will allow a court to question an expert's departure
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understanding of the scientific process will allow judges and lawyers to
differentiate between pseudoscientific claims and valid scientific claims.233
Science strives to explain, predict, understand, and control natural
phenomena. 234 These goals are achieved through the "cumulative growth of a
system of knowledge over time, in which useful features are retained and
nonuseful features are abandoned, based on the rejection or confirmation of
testable knowledge. ' 235 The study of science is generally progressive. 236 To a
certain extent, it also self-corrects as it continues to be refined based on new
observations and interpretations. Scientists facilitate this process through the
presentation, debate, and testing of new ideas.
To begin to comprehend how scientists approach the process of acquiring
knowledge, we should start with how scientists form the questions they will
explore. Most scientists are interested in finding patterns, particularly patterns
attributable to causal relationships. 237 That interest develops into a hypothesis
Although often phrased as a conclusion, each hypothesis is a question that
presupposes a pattern and that must be explored through experiments designed
to support or discredit the hypothesis itself.238
Legal scholars and practitioners should note that mistakes that will diminish
the predictive value of a scientific study can be made as early as the scientist's
formulation of a hypothesis.
If, for example, researchers want to know whether breast implants
increase the risk of connective tissue disease, they need to choose some
from well-accepted scientific practices).
233 Angell, supra n. 18, at 91. ("Not knowing the broad contours of the process feeds the
false belief that medical [and other scientific] research is somehow too complex to be
understood by nonscientists. This may be true of the details of any given study, but it is not
true of the broad outlines.").
234 Scientific laws describe repeating natural phenomena, while pseudoscientific claims
are idiosyncratic. One example of a pseudoscientific belief that has been widely
disseminated in the popular media is the purported link between childhood vaccines and
autism. Although numerous class action lawsuits have been filed throughout the U.S.
against vaccine manufacturers, the epidemiological studies performed to date show no link
between vaccines and autism. Sandra Blakeslee, Panel Cautions Against Mercury
Preservative, 151 N.Y. Times A16 (October 2, 2001). Childhood vaccines save children's'
lives and are generally considered safe. In fact, less than one child in one million will
experience any serious side effect as a result of immunization. Despite these statistics,
"[slome critics ignore the public health science and promote policies that jeopardize the
protection provided by childhood vaccines." Patricia Nolan, Providence Journal B9 (May
21, 2000) (Ms. Nolan is the Director of the Rhode Island Department of Health).
235 Shermer, supra n. 18, at 31 (emphasizing the unique cumulative nature of science).
236 Id. (explaining the progressivity of science).
237 David Knoke & George W. Bohmstedt, Basic Social Statistics 7 (1991).
238 Even conclusions in science are regarded as questions. See Jacob Bronowski, The
Ascent of Man 21 (Little, Brown & Co. 1972) (quoting Niels Bohr) ("Every sentence that I
utter should be regarded not as an assertion, but as a question.").
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suitable evidence of connective tissue disease and determine whether it is
more common in women with implants than in women without implants.
It would not be adequate to study whether women with implants are
fatigued because fatigue is not specifically enough related to connective
tissue disease and its presence or absence would not directly address the
question. 239
To avoid such mistakes at the outset of the scientific process, scientists propose
ideas and make informed guesses about patterns based on their own
observations or the work of other scientists. These patterns are frequently
referred to as associations or relationships between variables. 240 The initial
hypothesis, developed from these observations, may link certain variables
and/or speculate about causation, in an attempt to understand, explain, or
predict some natural phenomena. 241
An example taken from recent medical news involves the hypothesis that
exposing postmenopausal women to increased levels of estrogen reduces their
risk of heart disease.242 This hypothesis assumed a causal relationship between
two variables. The assumption is that a change in one variable, often referred
to as the independent variable 243 (i.e., the increased estrogen), creates a
predictable change in a second variable, often referred to as the "dependent
variable" (i.e., the reduction in the rate of heart disease).244
A scientific study based on any hypothesis will test the hypothesis against a
"null hypothesis" of no causal effect. The researcher will try to prove the null
hypothesis wrong. The null hypothesis is:
the assumption that the phenomenon they are studying does not cause the
effect they expect. In other words, the standard method of science is to
presume "innocence" and only with strong proof reject that
239 Angell, supra n. 18, at 92 (noting the importance of framing a hypothesis that fits
closely with the observations in the study).
240 A "variable" can be defined as "an observable characteristic of an object or event that
can be described according to some well-defined classification or measurement scheme."
Frederick Williams, Reasoning with Statistics: How to Read Quantitative Research 11 (4th
ed. 1992).
241 See generally E. Bright Wilson, Jr., An Introduction to Scientific Research (McGraw-
Hill Book Company, Inc. 1952) (describing the goals and methods of conducting scientific
research).
242 See Lindsey Tanner, Replacement Hormones: Study of 27,000 Women Examines
Value of Supplements, Chi. Trib. 7 (September 12, 2000) (examining the value of the
hormone supplement synthetic estrogen).
243 "Independent variables" are defined as "variables that represent the causes" and they
"also are called factors or explanatory variables." Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence,
supra n. 3, at 92.
244 Knoke & Bohmstedt, supra n. 237, at 7. A "dependent variable" can also be defined
as a "variable that characterizes the effect ... since it may depend on the causes; dependent
variables are also called response variables." Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence,
supra n. 3, at 92 (defining elements of a scientific hypothesis).
1076 [Vol. 81:1033
BEYOND THE POLEMIC AGAINST JUNK SCIENCE
presumption. 245
It should be noted that no amount of studying and testing of a sample from a
much larger population can prove conclusively that the null hypothesis is
wrong. It is simply impossible to use this standard methodology to prove a
negative. By contrast, one can very easily prove with 100% certainty that a
null hypothesis is wrong (or false) when the entire population comprises the
sample. For example, if I wished to study the relationship between
decapitation and death, in a population of ten "decapitees," I could not prove
the absolute falsity of a null hypothesis claiming that decapitation does not
cause death if I studied a sample consisting of eight of the ten "decapitees,"
although the power of my statistical analysis would still be extremely high.
However, if I studied all ten (i.e., the sample is the entire population), then I
could quite easily prove with complete certainty that the null hypothesis
(decapitation does not cause death) is false for this population. In the ordinary
circumstance of studying a sample portion of a population, each study that fails
to support the hypothesis makes the null hypothesis more likely. Conversely,
if extensive experimentation continues to support the hypothesis, a scientist
can amass enough evidence to make the hypothesis so probable that it is
considered true for all practical purposes. 246
When a scientist sets out to explore a preliminary hypothesis, his analysis
will be guided by the particular methodologies, i.e., the practices, procedures,
and protocols, that are accepted as fundamental to his discipline. A scientist
uses these methodologies to guide her research as she proposes, tests, and
refines various hypotheses and theories. For example, one methodology
common to all scientific disciplines is the requirement of accurate and detailed
record keeping. This method enables future scientists to assess the validity of
the original experiment through peer review and experiment replication.247 As
part of their record keeping, scientists should include both the experimental
results that support their hypothesis and those that do not.
After formulating the hypothesis and developing the study, researchers will
245 Faigman, supra n. 204, at 67 (defining the null hypothesis).
246 Angell, supra n. 18, at 97 (noting also that probability and uncertainty are to some
degree inherent to scientific research).
247 Daubert emphasized the importance of peer review in the judicial evaluation of
scientific evidence. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993). This
is based on the assumption that peer review has the potential to stop the progress of
unreliable scientific testing of invalid scientific theories. The most widely publicized
example of the power of peer review was the public announcement of successful cold fusion
experimentation, which was quickly followed by resounding refutation through extensive
peer review. The fact that no scientist has ever successfully replicated cold fusion
experiments shows how even well-respected scientists make mistakes. The cold fusion
debacle also demonstrated how peer review can correct these mistakes. See generally Gary
Taubes, Bad Science: The Short Life and Weird Times of Cold Fusion (Random House
1993) (describing cold fusion research, its "discovery" and public announcement, and the
refutation that followed).
2001] 1077
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
begin to amass data. 248  Data collection generally occurs through the
accumulation of three components: (1) anecdotal evidence, (2) observational
studies, and/or (3) controlled experimentation. Of the three methods of data
collection, controlled experiments are widely considered the best method for
testing theories of causation. All three methods, however, are worth
considering.
The first method of data collection listed above, the gathering of anecdotal
evidence, requires the scientist to keep a record of events that follow one
another. Reports of anecdotal evidence usually are obtained haphazardly or
selectively and do not sufficiently demonstrate that the first event causes the
second. As a result, anecdotal evidence can be suggestive but misleading. 249
The second method of data collection, observational studies, generally
occurs in the context of medical testing. Observational studies monitor what
happens to those who have already been exposed to the variable. Two useful
forms of observational studies are "cohort" studies and "case control"
studies.250 Cohort studies start with two similar groups of people, one exposed
to the variable and one unexposed. Normally in a cohort study, none of the
participants would have, for example, the disease being studied at the time the
study began. "Case-control" studies begin with two groups of similar people,
one comprised of people who already have the disease and one comprised of
people who do not. In either cohort or case control studies, the subjects of the
study are monitored over time and their medical conditions are compared.
Conclusions about the effect of exposure are then extrapolated from the
comparison data.
The third, and most reliable, method of data collection, controlled
experiments, generally tests and measures251 the consequences of exposing a
group of test subjects. The research protocol intentionally exposes one group
to a particular variable and does not expose the other group. 252 The best
method for determining whether a particular variable is a risk factor for a
specific disease is to find as large a group as possible of similar test subjects
and expose half of the group to the risk factor. The experimenter would then
follow both groups through time in order to compare the effects of exposure to
the risk factor with non-exposure.
248 Angell, supra n. 18, at 93 ("Collecting data means measuring or counting
something.").
249 Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, supra n. 3.
250 Angell, supra n. 18, at 99-100 (discussing epidemiological studies).
25 A "measurement" in the context of statistical research is "a scheme for the assignment
of numbers or symbols to specify different characteristics of a variable." Williams, supra n.
240, at 11 (defining "measurement").
252 The most reliable method for conducting controlled experimentation requires that
neither the experimenter nor the subjects know whether the subjects have been exposed to
the tested variable. This type of experiment is generally referred to as "double blind
testing."
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All three data collection methods are limited by the fact that very few risk
factors inevitably cause a particular outcome. More often, a successful
preliminary finding may identify a risk factor that is associated with a
particular disease. The association of a risk factor with a particular disease,
however, does not in itself speak to the causal relationship between the disease
and the risk factor. Association simply means that the data show that the risk
factor and disease are present. Indeed, even when the data indicate an
association, scientists may be unable to determine what, if any, role this risk
factor plays in causing the disease.253
Recent breast implant litigation illustrates the legal problems that arise when
association is mistaken for causation. In the early 1990s, the media and
numerous plaintiffs' attorneys brought to public attention a possible
association between silicone breast implants and connective tissue disease,
giving legal imprimatur to the causal connection between the implants and the
disease.254 In December 1991, a federal jury in San Francisco awarded a single
plaintiff $7.34 million dollars; five months later, the FDA banned silicone
breast implants.255 These verdicts led the public to assume that silicone breast
implants cause connective tissue disease.256 Such a connection has never been
shown. In fact, "none of the epideniological studies has been able to
demonstrate a clear link between breast implants and connective tissue disease
or suggestive symptoms." 257  Silicone breast implants might have had a
different fate if the court had marked a clearer distinction between association
and causation in considering the effect of silicone as an independent variable
on the human, the dependent variable.
Once the association between a risk factor and a possible outcome has been
identified, scientists begin the process of quantifying that risk. "Relative risk"
is the term used to describe the strength of association between a risk factor
and a particular outcome. 258 In medical research, for example, relative risk is
"the ratio of the incidence of the disease in an exposed population to that in an
unexposed population. '259  Generally, legitimate theories of scientific
causation must be based on strong link between independent and dependent
253 "It is a canon of science that association never proves causation." Foster & Huber,
supra n. 19, at 151 (distinguishing between "association" and "causation" in scientific
studies).
254 See Angell, supra n. 18, at 50-57 (commenting on the events leading up to the FDA
ban on silicone breast implants).
255 See W. Carlsen, Jury Awards $7.3 Million in Implant Case, San Francisco Chronicle
A13 (Dec. 14, 1991); Angell, supra n. 18, at 50-57.
256 Id.
257 Id. at 57 (showing that extensive research weakened the assumed causal relationship
between breast implants and connective tissue disease).
258 Foster & Huber, supra n. 19, at 78 (evaluating the statistical significance of a risk
factor in medical tests).
259 Id.
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variables. As the strength of the association increases, there is more support
for finding a causal connection. For example, "cigarette smoking is so strong a
risk factor for lung cancer that we are justified in saying it 'causes' cancer,
even though we do not yet know exactly how it does So. ' '260
As experimentation continues, the scientist will constantly reevaluate her
initial findings. Experimentation helps the scientist identify the strengths and
weaknesses of her initial hypothesis. Scientific testing may end if researchers
have collected data that are statistically significant. Statistical significance
means that the groups of data gathered from testing the hypothesis against the
null hypothesis "differ from each other at a predetermined level of
confidence." 261 In other words, statistically significant data shows that "the
association is unlikely to be due to chance. 262
The final steps in any empirical research involve the analysis of data and
development of conclusions. Mistakes in data analysis or in the extrapolation
of conclusions can invalidate any scientific study. When evaluating science,
we should be aware of the following problems. First, a statistical association
reported in a study may be a real cause-effect relationship, a sampling error, or
a result of a flaw in the researcher's methodology. Second, "[ijnterpreting a
study is perilous because of the strong temptation to reach conclusions that are
more encompassing than the evidence will support. '263 Third, even if a study
is persuasive under the conditions of an experiment, "extrapolat[ing] from the
conditions of a study to more general circumstances always raises
questions. ''264
During and after the empirical research, other scientists working in the field
may further refine the hypothesis. 265 At some point scientists will begin to
260 Angell, supra n. 18, at 98 (noting also that very few non-smokers get lung cancer).
Most risk factors, or independent variables, do not rise to the level of strength portrayed in
the cigarette smoking example. It is sometimes impossible to determine whether a
particular risk factor actually contributes to causing a disease or is simply associated with a
disease. Determining the strength of association, however, does not necessarily follow the
identification of an independent variable known as a risk factor in medical research. In fact,
identifying an independent variable sometimes depends on how strongly that variable
associates with a dependent variable. The very process that determines the association of
strength can sometimes be part of the identifying process. Id.
261 Beecher-Monas, supra n. 45, at 1095 (explaining probabilistic evaluation in
determining causation). Confidence levels are measurements of the probability that study
results from a given sample will be correct for the relevant population from which the
sample was drawn. Foster & Huber, supra n. 19 at 77.
262 Id. (illustrating the way scientists conclude there is an association between variables).
263 Id. at 94 (warning against the tendency to draw overly broad conclusions from data).
264 Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, supra n. 3, at 96 (explaining the uncertainty
in generalizing scientific results to broader circumstances).
265 Cumulative scientific knowledge is gained by the processes of observation,
experimentation, quantification, corroboration, and correction by other scientists. See e.g.
Beecher-Monas, supra n. 45, at 1095 (observing that "scientists recognize that multiple
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share results and compare testing mechanisms. Disparities in experimental
conditions and their potential effects on scientific outcomes may be compared
and contrasted. A hypothesis that has yielded statistically significant results
should then be incorporated back into the methodologies that will govern
future work in this discipline. In this way, the methodologies controlling most
scientific disciplines are constantly enhanced and refined. Understanding
scientific methodologies should help judges and lawyers identify the proposed
expert testimony that is based on nonscientific or pseudoscientific
theories. 266As part of the admissibility inquiry, legitimate experts should be
able to identify and articulate for the court the current methodologies employed
by experts in the field to validate tested hypotheses.
D. Misunderstanding Statistics
1. Why We Need to Understand Basic Principles of Statistics
Legal scholars and practitioners who must assess the quality of scientific
evidence must also acquire a basic understanding of core statistical concepts.
Because statistical reasoning underlies all empirical research, we must become
familiar with statistics and probabilistic reasoning to prepare for complex
scientific or mathematical issues. 267 Legal scholars and practitioners, however,
are often confounded by the principles of statistical analysis, risk assessment,
probabilistic attribution, and attendant mathematical jargon. This confusion
persists despite the fact that "statistical analysis and probabilistic thinking are
key to understanding the validity of scientific studies .... [and] probabilistic
reasoning is the foundation of modem science. '268 Confusion over statistics
can also arise in court when a discomfort with science encourages the
development of vague measurements that further obfuscate the appropriate
inquiry. For example, questions couched in imprecise but widely used terms
such as "a reasonable degree of medical certainty," are often susceptible to
more accurate quantification.
confirmatory studies in different disciplines reinforce the conclusions of a single study").
266 Faigman, supra n. 204, at 4 (identifying handwriting identification as an example of a
discipline that does not use rigorous scientific methods.) Faigman supports this conclusion
by citing the "lack of empirical validation and failure to conduct proficiency testing, the
failure to 'blind' testers to expected results, and the overwhelming subjective component" in
handwriting analysis methods. Id.
267 Id. at 70-71.
268 Beecher-Monas, supra n. 45, at 1069. Legal scholars and practitioners may not be the
only ones whom statistics confuse. A 1988 article published in the British Journal of
Surgery found that 39% of the articles surveyed contained serious statistical errors that
justified rejection of the article. See Foster & Huber, supra n. 19, at 148(discussing
statistics-related problems faced by scientists). As one commentator notes, "U]ust because a
study has used statistics is no guarantee of its worth. In fact, statistics can be misused either
intentionally or unwittingly, and it is not difficult to locate quantitative studies where
statistics were not really needed at all." Williams, supra n. 240, at 3.
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As a preliminary matter, experts in all aspects of science testify to
probabilities or statistical measurements in practice. For that reason, judges
and lawyers need to decide in advance how they will approach the job of
understanding and assessing this information at trial. To avoid lengthy
courtroom debate, much of this evaluation should be done pretrial. Once trial
has begun, the Federal Judicial Center has advanced the following alternative
to the traditional sequential presentation of experts:
[W]hen the reports of witnesses go together, the judge might allow their
presentations to be combined and the witnesses to be questioned as a
panel rather than sequentially. More narrative testimony might be
allowed, and the expert might be permitted to give a brief tutorial on
statistics as a preliminary to some testimony. Instead of allowing the
parties to present their experts in the midst of all the other evidence, the
judge might call for the experts for opposing sides to testify at about the
same time.269
This structure has the advantage of enabling jurors to have complex testimony
from one side fresh in their minds when they listen to testimony from an
opponent's expert. Confusion might also be alleviated if experts can relate the
areas of agreement and address their difference to the jury through a controlled
dialogue
2. How to Improve Our Understanding of Basic Statistics
a. Legal Practitioners and Scholars Probably Know More About
Statistical Analysis Than They Realize
Those unfamiliar with statistics should bear in mind that statistics are simply
mathematical quantifications of risk, analogous to the bases for many other
legal decisions. 270 Although a primer on basic statistical concepts is beyond
the scope of this Article, even novices should quickly recognize that they are
more familiar with basic statistical concepts than they realize.27' Many of the
questions routinely addressed by a court involve an explicit or implicit
statistical assessment. 272
269 Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, supra n. 3, at 89.
270 See Stephen E. Feinberg, Samuel H. Krislov & Miron L. Straf, Understanding and
Evaluating Statistical Evidence in Litigation, 36 Jurimetrics 1, 2 (1995).
27I Legal scholars and practitioners can use their everyday experience to understand
fundamental principles of statistics. For example, common sense would tell us that a valid
comparison of student performance between two separate law school classes requires that
we know more than just the mean (i.e., average) student grade. A meaningful comparison
requires that we also know the median (the middle value in the distribution, half the grades
are below this number and half above) and the distribution of grades along the grading scale.
272 Feinberg et al., supra n. 270, at 3 (noting that statistical evidence is introduced to a
court implicitly through reasoned judgments and explicitly through testimony on scientific
data).
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In fact, at some level of abstraction, all decisions made by the judge during a
trial are probabilistic. For example, determining the admissibility of evidence
at trial requires that lawyers argue, and judges decide, the likelihood that the
evidence, if admitted, will make some fact of consequence more or less
likely.273 The admissibility decision also requires the judge to assess the
degree of risk of unfair prejudice, confusion, delay, and needless accumulation
of evidence, that could result from admitting this evidence.274 As the trial
progresses, judges must make numerous legal decisions that contain implicit
assumptions involving risks and probabilities. Legal scholars and practitioners
might therefore alleviate their discomfort with statistical concepts by
recognizing that statistics are simply a mathematical representation of the type
of legal assessments, or balancing of probabilities, common to legal practice
and judicial decision-making.
In addition to recognizing that litigation is full of probabilistic decision-
making, legal scholars and practitioners should anticipate that they will be
required to evaluate statistical data to assess the "predictive value" of proffered
test results and theories.
[A] test that has a high predictive value is likely to identify individuals
correctly; it is trustworthy. Predictive value clearly depends on both the
qualities of the test itself (sensitivity and specificity) and the base rate.
The predictive value is the ratio of true positives (individuals who test
positive and who really are infected, for example) to the total number of
people who test positive, correctly or incorrectly. 275
In practice, litigants advance statistical analyses measuring the predictive
value of scientific tests or theories in a variety of situations. An opposing party
may use statistical information to dispute any or all of the components of the
methodological process of scientific evidence proffered by the other side.
Parties may sometimes agree on a particular hypothesis, acknowledge that an
experiment is well designed, and conclude that the data collection was accurate
while disagreeing about the proponent's estimate of statistical significance of
the test results. Thus, legal practitioners and scholars may require a basic
understanding of statistics to comprehend how the opinions of two experts
actually differ.276 Such an understanding will decrease the possibility that
factfinders will base decisions on immaterial facts.277 Confusion over statistics
or mathematics should not lead judges and lawyers to lose sight of certain
273 Fed. R. Evid. 401 (2000) (defining the term "relevant evidence").
274 Fed. R. Evid. 403 (2000) (allowing exclusion of evidence if the danger of unfair
prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value).
275 Foster & Huber, supra n. 19, at 115 (describing how Bayes' theorem defines
predictive value).
276 See Feinberg et al., supra n. 270, at 7 (citing concern over a factfinder's ability to
resolve differences between conflicting expert testimony).
277 See id. at 9 ( remarking that judges without a solid understanding of statistics may
base decisions on irrelevant factors).
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unassailable truths.
One basic truth is that the predictive value of any experiment will increase
as the base rate for the tested condition rises. 278 In other words, experiments
that claim to identify conditions that we know from reliable data are common
in the relevant population often yield correct results. 279 For example, if a test
shows that a 30-year-old adult received an MMR (Measles, Mumps and
Rubella) vaccination, and if we know that the vast majority of 30-year-old
adults have received this vaccine, it is likely that the test result is valid.280 By
contrast, even well-designed tests are more likely to yield incorrect results
when they search for rare events. 28' For this reason, if judges and lawyers
assess the base rate as a preliminary step, they can place statistical data in
context and allow an inference of likelihood and probability. These examples
show us that we should not abandon common sense in the face of confusing
statistical jargon.
b. Core Principles of Statistical Analysis
Understanding the statistical inferences made from scientific evidence
requires knowledge of how empirical tests are designed, data is collected, and
results are interpreted. 282 Statistical research may focus on single variables or
multiple variables. Statistical analyses applied to single variables are
commonly referred to as descriptive statistics.283  Descriptive statistics,
gathered through observation, provide numerical detail designed to enhance
our understanding of the properties of a variable, e.g., the average rainfall,
interest rates, populations, or proportions of 18-year-olds attending college. 284
Most of the statistical research encountered by legal practitioners and scholars,
however, assesses the impact of multiple variables. Research involving
multiple variables involves inferential statistics, which provides mathematical
tools for exploring the relationship between two or more variables. 285 The
relationship between the variables may simply be observed and recorded, or
278 See Foster & Huber, supra n. 19, at 114 (asserting that the predictive value of a test
depends on the prevalence of the condition in the population and noting that prevalence is
also referred to as the base rate of the condition).
279 See id. at 114 (commenting that tests used to diagnose common conditions have a
higher probability of accuracy).
280 See id. (offering a parallel example).
281 See id. at 116 (explaining that a positive result for HIV (the Human
Immunodeficiency Virus) in a population based on random selection is unreliable due to the
low base rate).
282 See Feinberg et al., supra n. 270, at 12 (stating that courts must have basic
understanding of models and assumptions to understand statistical evidence).
283 Descriptive statistics describe the "calculated values that represent certain overall
characteristics of a body of data." Williams, supra n. 240, at 13.
284 Knoke & Bohmstedt, supra n. 237, at 11.
285 Id.
1084 [Vol. 81:1033
BEYOND THE POLEMIC AGAINST JUNK SCIENCE
the researcher may manipulate the variables. 286
Only a statistically significant relationship between variables helps to
determine causation. Most scientists define "statistically significant" test
results as results that have a 5% or smaller chance of being random. 287 This
requirement corresponds to a p value ('p' derives from 'probability') of 0.05
and a confidence level of 95%.288 A p value of 0.05 means that "there is a
probability of less than 5 percent-according to the statistical tests used-that
the investigators would have recorded a difference ... [that] large in the
sample if the populations from which the [sample] groups were drawn were the
same with respect to the properties being compared. '289 A p-value factor of
0.05 does not mean that the hypothesis has a 95% chance of being correct. It
means only that the result observed has a 95% chance of being valid.
Legal practitioners and scholars who assess statistical significance should
also recognize the difference between the measurement of the size of the
scientific effect and the measurement of the degree of certainty. For instance,
a study might conclude that exposure to chemical "x" results in a 10%
increased risk for developing a particular disease. This result measures the size
of the scientific effect. However, this same study might have a p-factor of 0.02
indicating a 98% certainty that the results were not random.
Although existing legal doctrine does not require the judge to incorporate
the scientific standard of statistical significance into the admissibility
determination, basic comprehension of core statistical concepts has at least
three distinct advantages for the court. First, the judge will be more
comfortable assessing the validity of proffered scientific evidence. Second,
this approach has the advantage of providing the court with a high level of
certainty. 290 Finally, judges who understand how scientists measure test results
are less likely to confuse different scientific measurements or the legal and
scientific burdens of proof.291
286 Williams, supra n. 240, at 15 (contrasting descriptive and experimental methods).
287 Foster & Huber, supra n. 19, at 77 (defining "statistical significance").
288 Feinberg et al., supra n. 270, at 22 (describing statistical significance as set by
convention at a confidence level of 95%). Scientists generally require a confidence level of
95% before they consider results scientifically significant. See Foster & Huber, supra n. 19,
at 78 (explaining that scientists choose small p values so they do not falsely identify an
effect). For a discussion of the kinds of uncertainty in the statistical evidence that appears in
toxic tort litigation, see Troyen A. Brennan, Helping Courts with Toxic Torts: Some
Proposals Regarding Alternative Methods for Preventing and Assessing Scientific Evidence
in Common Law Courts, 51 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 24 (1990).
289 Foster & Huber, supra n. 19, at 77 (explaining the meaning of ap value set at 0.05).
290 See Feinberg et al., supra n. 270, at 7 (arguing that courts have welcomed statistical
evidence to establish the cause-and-effect relationship). Reliance on the standard of
statistical significance by judges predates Daubert. See e.g. Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 1989) (citing plaintiff's failure to provide the court with a
study demonstrating statistical significance as reason for judgment in defendant's favor).
291 See Feinberg et al., supra n. 270, at 7 (contending that understanding scientific
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c. Recognizing the Importance of Error Rates
No observation, test, or study is ever infallible. Competent statistical
analysis requires some exploration into, and thus an understanding of, the
related issue of error rates.292 In fact, Daubert instructs judges and lawyers to
consider error rates when determining the admissibility of proposed scientific
evidence.2 93
To understand scientific error rates, we must familiarize ourselves with false
negative, false positive, and sampling errors. A false negative error occurs if
the experimenter misses a real effect; a false positive error results when the
experimenter perceives an effect that did not occur.294 The rates of false
positives and false negatives affect the accuracy of the test. 295  Second,
sampling error may also increase when an experimenter extrapolates the results
of a small sample of a population to a much larger group.2 96 Findings that do
not rise to the level of statistical significance do not necessarily provide
evidence about the validity of the hypothesis. A negative or inconclusive result
means only that the experiment failed to identify positive results.2 97
Problems with error rate calculations most often arise in the context of a
controversy regarding the accuracy of the expert's risk assessment. 298 This
controversy often accompanies studies claiming that a substance is causally
connected to the development of a disease, such as cancer, in highly exposed
animals, while epidemiological data concerning humans are either negative or
mixed. 299 When human studies fail to demonstrate a statistically significant
evidence will decrease the risk of decisions based on irrelevancies); see e.g. In re Joint
Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1128-29 (2d Cir. 1995) (confusing the statistical significance
with the degree of risk).
292 Scientists can learn from their failures as well as their successes. Mistakes are
generally considered to be a normal part of the scientific process. See e.g. Park, supra n. 15,
at 9 ("Error is a normal part of science and uncovering flaws in scientific observation or
reasoning is the everyday wok of scientists"). Moreover, hypotheses that have been
disproved through experimentation and analysis can also bring scientists closer to the truth.
Results of unsuccessful attempts to validate hypotheses are often published so that other
scientists can learn from the results.
293 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
294 Foster & Huber, supra n. 19, at 75 (defining the "accuracy of the test" as "the
frequency with which the test will produce positive results when given known positive
samples").
295 Id. at 76.
296 Id. (noting that an investigator must choose parameters carefully since false positives,
as well as false negatives, affect accuracy and result in sampling error).
297 Id. (citing the example of epidemiological studies).
299 Id. Risk assessment is "the identification and quantification of risks." Id.
299 Id. For an excellent discussion of cases involving animal studies, see Capra, supra n.
47, at 716-17. Capra suggests that the federal courts have taken a type of "best evidence"
approach to animal studies. This means that if valid human epidemiological studies are
available, then animal studies are often rejected. By contrast, if the epidemiological data do
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increased risk of cancer, it is unclear whether the study results are negative
(there was no effect) or inconclusive (the effect did not reach the level of
statistical significance, the test was flawed, etc.). 300 This problem can be
compounded when scientists or the general public mischaracterize or
misunderstand inadequate study results as disproving a hypothesis. 30'
III. IDENTIFYING COMPLEX SCIENTIFIC QUESTIONS AND CRAFTING CREATIVE
INTERDISCIPLINARY SOLUTIONS
It would be overly simplistic to assume that legal scholars and practitioners
who manage to both master the requirements of Kumho and acquire a basic
understanding of scientific jargon, methods, and statistical concepts will be
equipped to tackle every question involving scientific evidence. Some cases
are too technical for nonscientist judges and lawyers to comprehend fully, and
science is so broad that methodologies vary significantly between different
scientific disciplines. Even Justice Breyer has conceded that "judges are not
scientists and do not have the scientific training that can facilitate the making
of such [scientific] decisions. ' '30 2 However, legal practitioners and scholars
who increase their scientific sophistication will also improve their ability to
identify scientific issues that require a creative, interdisciplinary approach for
resolution.
Judges have numerous options for obtaining outside assistance with
complex scientific or technical questions.
[A]s cases presenting significant science-related issues have increased in
number, judges have increasingly found in the Rules of Evidence and
Civil Procedure ways to help them overcome the inherent difficulty of
making determinations about complicated scientific or otherwise
technical evidence. Among these techniques are an increased use of Rule
16's pretrial conference authority to narrow the scientific issues in
dispute, pretrial hearings where potential experts are subject to
examination by the court, and the appointment of special masters and
specially trained law clerks. 30 3
Although these procedures are a topic of discussion among both legal
scholars 30 4 and scientific experts calling for reform of the courts,30 5 they have
not exist, a valid animal study can be used by the expert to support her opinion. Id.
300 Foster & Hube, supra n. 19, at 132 (noting that a negative studies raise questions such
as whether there actually was no effect or whether the result is due to a deficiency in, or the
sensitivity of, the study).
301 Id. (arguing that negative studies do not prove that there are no positive effects).
302 General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 148 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
303 Id. at 149.
34 See e.g. Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, The Use of Court-Appointed Experts in
Federal Courts, 78 Judicature 41 (1994) (discussing the reasons why few judges utilize
Federal Rule of Evidence 706 when authorizing the appointment of experts).
"I Angell, supra n. 18, at 205 (arguing that "the most important reform we could make
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been frequently ignored by the federal courts. 306
A. Recent Interdisciplinary Programs Designed to Enhance the Use of
Science in the Courts
Recently, an increased awareness of the importance of scientific
comprehension in the courts has led to more organized efforts by the federal
judiciary to search for methods to improve the quality of the science used by
the courts. One such development is the Federal Judicial Center collaboration
with the National Academy of Sciences to develop a program within the
Academy on "Science, Technology and Law. '30 7 Another national program
that may provoke positive developments and better interdisciplinary
communication involves the National Conference of Lawyers and Scientists, a
joint committee of the American Association for the Advancement of Science
and the Science and Technology Section of the American Bar Association.
The National Conference of Lawyers and Scientists is currently developing a
project to test the effect of an increased use of court-appointed, neutral,
scientific or technical experts. 308 They propose that courts should appoint
candidates recruited from scientific and professional organizations to serve as
experts to resolve issues in cases where it is thought that the traditional
adversarial system probably will not adequately provide the information
needed for a reasoned and principled decision.309
B. Individual Judges Can Enhance the Use of Science in Their Own
Courtrooms
In addition to these large-scale programs, some creative judges have been
to raise scientific standards in the courtroom would be for judges to appoint expert
witnesses").
306 See Cecil & Willging, supra n. 304, at 46 (concluding that many judges believe that
the use of court-appointed experts impedes the adversary system). "[T]he primary
impediment to the use of experts... [is the] [j]udges' devotion to the adversarial
presentation of evidence [which] causes them to reserve this procedure for those rare cases
in which the adversarial system fails to provide information necessary for a reasoned and
principled decision." Id.; Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 1113, 1191
(1991) (discussing studies that show that judges rarely use court-appointed experts).
307 Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, supra n. 3, at 5 (describing the objective of
the project). Justice Breyer described this development in the following manner:
This program will bring together on a regular basis knowledgeable scientists,
engineers, judges, attorneys, and corporate and government officials to explore areas of
interaction and improve communication among the science, engineering, and legal
communities. This program is intended to provide a neutral, nonadversarial forum for
promoting understanding, encouraging imaginative approaches to problem solving, and
conducting studies.
Id.
308 Id. at 7.
309 Id.
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experimenting with neutral scientific or technical experts. As Justice Breyer
noted:
Federal trial judges, looking for ways to perform this [inquiry into the
admissibility of scientific evidence] function better, increasingly have
used . . . pretrial conferences to narrow the scientific issues in dispute,
pretrial hearings where potential experts are subject to examination by the
court, and the appointment of specially trained law clerks or scientific
special masters.310
One source of judicial creativity is Federal Rule of Evidence 706, which
permits the court on its own motion, or on the motion of any party, to appoint
neutral expert witnesses. 311 Some innovative judges have used this rule to
appoint independent scientific or technical experts, not only as testifying
witnesses but also as scientific special masters. 312 Rule 706 embodies the
belief that "[l]ess tainted by partisanship, court appointed experts may identify
areas where little disagreement in the scientific community exists, thereby
narrowing the range of controversy."313 Cross-examination of such experts
therefore shifts its focus away from witness competence and integrity and
towards areas where scientific evidence is in genuine dispute.3 14 Recently, one
district court judge hearing a case on silicone breast implants appointed a
"neutral science panel" of four prominent and neutral scientists to prepare
testimony for the court on the scientific basis of plaintiffs medical claims. 315
Proposals involving neutral scientific experts sometimes arise from a
concern that expert witnesses often have interests that are too closely aligned
with the parties that are paying their (sometimes exorbitant) fees. In fact, the
Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 706 begin by stating that "[t]he practice of
shopping for experts, the venality of some experts, and the reluctance of many
310 Breyer, supra n. 3, at 6.
311 Fed. R. Evid. 706 (2000) (granting courts the power to appoint expert witnesses on
their own motion or on that of any other party). See also Joe S. Cecil &Thomas E.
Willging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation: Defining a Role for Court-Appointed Experts in
Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 Emory L.J. 995, 1002 (1994) (asserting that the application
of Federal Rule of Evidence 706 derives from the court's inherent authority to invite experts
to assist them).
312 Cecil & Willging, supra n. 304, at 1000-02 (discussing the range of functions expert
witnesses have fulfilled in certain cases); see also, Jack B. Weinstein, Individual Justice in
Mass Tort Litigation: The Effect of Class Actions, Consolidations, and Other Multiparty
Devices 116 (Northwestern U. Press 1995) (contending that judges should appoint
independent experts and encourage analysis by independent national groups in complexes
cases).
313 Sanders, supra n. 21, at 378.
314 Id.
311 Olivia Judson, Slide-Rule Justice, 1999 Natil. J. 2882, 2885-86 (Oct 9,1999)
(evaluating the impact of an Alabama federal district court's appointment of a panel of
scientists to analyze data and decide whether breast implants cause chronic disease).
10892001]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
reputable experts to involve themselves in litigation, have been matters of deep
concern." 316 Similar concerns have been echoed by legal commentators. 317 As
Dr. Marcia Angell describes the problem,
expert witnesses are selected by the contesting lawyers, paid by them, and
their testimony is rehearsed in advance-circumstances unlikely to ensure
competence, let alone objectivity. In fact, the whole point is precisely to
find a 'qualified witness' who will be scientifically committed to your
side.3 18
Thus, proposals for neutral experts also address concerns about slanted or
biased scientific evidence provided by experts with a pecuniary interest in the
outcome of the case. Other proposals derive from the assumption that our jury
system provides little assistance to judges, lawyers, and jurors struggling to
understand scientific evidence. 319
Programs to enhance the comprehension of science in the courts should
examine experiments like recent efforts undertaken in Arizona to enhance juror
understanding and participation. 320  For the past five years, Arizona has
enacted sweeping changes in state courtroom procedures allowing jurors to
take notes,321 ask questions, and, in civil cases, to discuss the trial prior to
316 Fed. R. Evid. 706 (2000) (advisory committee notes).
317 See Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions Underlying the Debate about
Scientific Evidence: A Closer Look at "Juror Incompetence" and Scientific "Objectivity,"
25 Conn. L. Rev. 1083, 1092 (1993). Jacobs notes that
[flor the commentators, however, the problem with the expert witness industry has to
do not with the quantity but with the quality of its product. Instead of offering us
truthsayers, they claim the new firms sell us con artists; instead of steak we get sizzle.
And, more to the point, the sizzle hopelessly confuses us. Competent lawyers cannot
help us see through it, and ultimately we are deceived into verdicts that are palpably
'wrong.'
318 Angell, supra n. 18, at 118 (insinuating that the role of the scientist and expert witness
are at odds because an expert witness is supposed to give an opinion on, rather than a
competent interpretation of, the data).
311 See Robert D. Myers, Ronald S. Reinstein & Gordon M. Griller, Complex Scientific
Evidence and the Jury, 83 Judicature 150, 152 (1999) (arguing that the current judicial
system should be reformed to educate the jury better).
What the research shows then, along with the experiments and experiences of active
and concerned judges in complex cases, is that the trial process itself may be as much
an impediment to jury comprehension and understanding as the complexity of the legal
concepts and evidence, or the competencies of jurors.
Id. (citation omitted).
320 Id. at 152-56 (describing Arizona's 1995 jury rule changes); see also Fred Misko Jr.
& Frank E. Goodrich, Managing Complex Litigation: Class Actions and Mass Torts, 48
Baylor L. Rev. 1001, 1074-75 (1996) (discussing the procedure that might be employed in
complex cases to increase juror comprehension).
321 While allowing juror note-taking is within the discretion of the court, few
jurisdictions allow the practice. Myers, Reinstein & Griller, supra n. 319, at 154 (arguing
that courts should allow note-taking).
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deliberations. 322 Arizona has also endeavored to enhance comprehension by
rewriting and clarifying jury instructions. 323
CONCLUSION
We live in a world infused with science and technology. Scientific
discoveries and technical developments influence and alter our daily lives. As
we grow more dependent on science, we will find that practitioners of science
and law may not share the same visions or goals. When the goals of science
and law collide, these disputes must be resolved using the facts of science and
the methodologies of law. The awkward marriage of science and law in the
courts has too often led to frustrated lawyers, overburdened judges, and
abstruse scholarship.
To improve our ability to understand and use science within the federal
courts we must treat the disjuncture between science and law not as a
theoretical problem but as a practical one. First, we must comprehend the new
legal methodology. Although Daubert may have created a vague and
unwieldy standard, Justice Breyer's Kumho opinion crafted a better analytic
tool. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits are likely just the first of the federal
courts to recognize the significant impact of Kumho on the scope and nature of
the judicial inquiry. Second, we must expand and enhance our understanding
of basic scientific language, methods, and statistical measurements. This
knowledge will improve our legal decision-making and enhance our ability to
craft to craft creative interdisciplinary solutions for resolving legal cases that
turn on highly complex scientific or technical information.
If legal practitioners and scholars maintain a broad focus on the range of
scientific mistakes and misunderstandings that permeate the law, they can
avoid being sidetracked by concerns limited to junk science. This broad view
must also be objective. Those trained as advocates must recognize that
scientific validity is independent of our legal goals. Justice Breyer has charged
the courts to "aim for decisions that, roughly speaking, approximately reflect
the scientific state of the art."' 32 4 Although many of us may have chosen law
school only after seeing our freshman chemistry grades, we are nevertheless up
to this task.
322 See id (describing Arizona's 1995 reforms).
323 See id. (explaining how jurors in Arizona receive pretrial instructions that define
relevant legal terms and the elements of the alleged crime).
324 Breyer, supra n. 11.
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